In the aftermath of the financial crisis, why have reforms been incremental, despite the fact that conditions for rapid transformation appeared to be available? Is there anything specific about financial policy that prevents more radical reforms?
Drawing from comparative politics and historical institutionalism in particular, as well as international political economy, this book answers these questions by examining the particular institutional frictions which characterise global financial governance, and which influence the activity of change agents and veto players involved in global regulatory change.
Chapters demonstrate that the process of change in financial rule-making, as well as in the institutions governing finance, do not fit with the punctuated model of policy change. They also show, however, that incremental changes can lead to fundamental shifts in the basic principles that inform global financial governance.
'The global financial crisis was, by any measure, a great systemic shock that has so far led to a series of less-than-great systemic transformations - at least in the area of financial reform. Moschella and Tsingou explain why this is the case. By harnessing the insights of historical institutionalism to those of agent-centred constructivism, they show us why great institutional transformations may take a lot longer, and may be significantly more contingent, than we generally think.'
Professor of International Political Economy, Brown University
'Many expected the financial collapse of 2007/8 to provoke significant reform of financial systems around the globe. So far, at least, national governments have been slow to act. Moschella and Tsingou's fascinating and thoughtful volume helps us understand why. The editors have pulled together well reasoned, persuasive essays examining the politics and political economy of financial reform efforts around the globe. Eschewing the temptation to blame specific interests and their compliant politicians, the authors give give us a set of nuanced stories that go beyond the politics of financial reform, helping us better understand why institutional change itself is so difficult.
This book will be of great interest for political economists interested in the politics of banking and financial regulation in the early twenty-first century, as well as for historical institutionalists interested in the politics of institutional change.'
Professor and Chair in Political Economy and Public Policy, European University Institute
'In this timely, tightly argued, and empirically trenchant study, Moschella and Tsingou provide the strongest statement yet of why national and international post-crisis reform packages have fallen short of their most ambitious goals. Covering virtually every area of the international financial system, the editors and their collaborators detail the origins and consequences of incremental policy changes, but note that, in the end, reforms may produce a subtle transformation in financial market regulation. Great Expectations, Slow Transformations will long remain a major resource for scholars of post-crisis capitalism.'
Associate Professor, Temple University