

Chapter 1

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a major political and economic achievement in post–World War II Europe, created to guarantee the stability, growth and prosperity of its members. Over the past decades, it has expanded its jurisdictional authority over a number of key policy areas, including the single market, trade, the euro currency, justice, fundamental rights and citizenship. However, increased economic and political integration have produced growing party and public opposition. Euroscepticism, a term used to describe the disapproval of and opposition to closer European integration, has become an ‘embedded’ feature of both national and EU politics ‘with the potential to cause irreparable damage to the EU’s quest for legitimacy and stability’ (Usherwood and Startin 2013: 2). The EU’s failure to promptly resolve the Eurozone and migration crises has further eroded the project’s credibility and has strengthened anti-EU sentiment among European citizens. Trust in the EU was at a record low at 33 per cent in 2016 compared to 57 per cent in 2007 (Eurobarometer 2016).

Within this ever-growing environment of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), the strongest advocates of Eurosceptic views may be found within the far right party family (Vasilopoulou 2011). Far right parties perceive the EU as posing a threat to nation-states’ cultural homogeneity and national sovereignty. The EU’s supranational decision-making structures, its global outlook and its promotion of cultural diversity go against the far right’s mission of defending the nation (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; see also Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002). Far right parties are also ideally placed to oppose the EU. Their marginal position in their domestic party systems provides them with additional incentives to criticise the EU (e.g. Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001). Indeed, Hainsworth (2008: 85) argues that ‘[these parties] are well placed to act as the voice of popular opposition and protest

against developments declared to be anti-national'. In short, by virtue of their nationalist ideology and marginal status, far right parties across Europe put forward similar Eurosceptic positions, i.e., they oppose the entire process of European integration. These parties are 'distinguished by their intense Europhobia' (Marks and Wilson 2000: 457).

This book questions this very premise. It argues and empirically substantiates that far right party Euroscepticism is by no means uniform. In fact, a comparison of these parties' positions on European integration reveals that they vary from complete rejection of the entire EU project to weak support for aspects of European integration. For example, despite a somewhat positive approach in the 1980s, the French National Front's EU position has crystallised into strong opposition to the EU. The party rejects the principle of multilateral co-operation at the EU level. It denounces all EU treaties as allegedly marking the end of nation-states' political sovereignty and economic prosperity. Marine Le Pen – President of the party since 2011 – has maintained her father's hard Eurosceptic position by calling for a referendum on France's EU membership. Following the party's historic victory during the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, when it claimed first place in the polls, Marine Le Pen upheld this view by stating: 'I do not want this European Soviet Union' (Spiegel 2014). Other far right parties, such as the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), on the other hand, do not support their country's withdrawal from the EU. While LAOS opposes the creation of a European political union and is critical of various EU policies, it accepts the principle of European co-operation at a higher multilateral level. Interestingly, despite the fact that the Greek crisis presented an opportunity for the party to harden its EU stance, LAOS weakly supported the EU's economic adjustment programme for Greece. The – now dissolved – Italian National Alliance (successor of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement) progressed from a critical position in the 1980s and early 1990s towards a more conciliatory view of European integration in the 2000s. The party accepted, by and large, EU policy integration and recognised the importance of EU institutions. Although it was unfavourable to various aspects of the EU project, its criticisms were mostly technical rather than substantive.

Comparative expert survey data also confirm this variation. Contrary to expectations, not all far right parties put forward extreme Eurosceptic positions. Rather, scores on the EU dimension range considerably with some far right parties strongly opposing the EU and others presenting relatively centrist or even pro-EU positions. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates strong opposition to the EU and 7 strong support (Bakker et al. 2015), parties such as the French National Front, the British National Party and the Hungarian Jobbik have consistently positioned themselves very close to the Eurosceptic end of the dimension. Other far right parties, however, such as

the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom and the Italian National Alliance, have been supportive of various aspects of European integration, scoring between 4 and 5.75 on the same dimension. A third subset of far right parties, including the Greek LAOS, the Danish People's Party, the Northern League and the Bulgarian Attack, have adopted comparatively more moderate positions, scoring between 2 and 3 on the scale (Vasilopoulou 2018).

Why do ideologically similar parties oppose the EU to differing extents? The goal of this book is to conceptualise, analyse and explain patterns of far right Euroscepticism. In doing so, it focuses on party positions on the EU and the ways in which these parties may frame European integration. Starting from the assumption that far right parties are rational actors, the book argues that the way in which they may interpret structural incentives depends largely on their relationship with democracy, their attitude towards the polity, their target electorate/social basis and their behaviour towards competitors. Classification on these indicators leads to the identification of three far right party models, i.e., what this book terms anti-system, anti-liberal and normalised. Given that the EU is a core issue in far right parties' toolkit, it becomes a key policy in party competition. Anti-system far right parties tend to opt for a rejectionist position on the EU; anti-liberal far right parties tend to be conditional Eurosceptics; and normalised far right parties tend to adopt a compromising position on the EU. The specific Eurosceptic frame that parties may prioritise depends on the domestic political context and the ways in which they may perceive national identity. This book's findings are relevant in light of Europe's political and economic crises, and rising public support for Eurosceptic ideas and far right parties.

EXPLAINING FAR RIGHT EUROSCEPTICISM

The literature on party-based Euroscepticism has been structured in terms of party-level ideological (e.g. Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004) and national-level tactical (e.g. Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b) explanations. These have been summarised as the North Carolina and the Sussex 'schools' of Euroscepticism, respectively (Mudde 2011). The North Carolina school places emphasis on the role of cleavages and party ideology in predicting whether a party would oppose or support the EU. Issues related to European integration are assimilated into existing dimensions of political contestation. This relationship may be summarised as an inverted U-curve with parties situated on the extremes of the economic left-right dimension opposing EU integration and centrist parties supporting the EU project. The Sussex school, on the other hand, views parties as strategic actors whose EU position depends

on nation-specific characteristics and party competition. These include the configuration of the party system, probability to access office and positions of major potential allies or competitors. Opposition parties and those with a marginal status in the system are more likely to oppose the EU in order to signal to voters their difference from the establishment.

This book does not treat these explanations as antithetical, and demonstrates that ideology and strategy are integral to party behaviour. In fact, they are ‘mutually enforcing rather than mutually exclusive’ (De Vries and Edwards 2009: 11; see also Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). On the one hand, centre-left and centre-right parties have regularly participated in government, and have been involved in EU decision-making. Given that the EU is the product of a carefully crafted compromise between centre-right market liberalisation and centre-left market regulation belief systems, centrist parties have limited incentives to criticise it. On the other hand, extremist parties view the EU project as antithetical to their core values. For parties of the far right, the EU is a super-structure seeking to dismantle the nation-state. For parties of the far left, EU policies go against the interests of the working class. At the same time, despite increasing success in the polls, these parties tend to operate in the margins of their respective party systems, and employ their EU stance as a way of distancing themselves from the mainstream.

Far right party Euroscepticism, which is the focus of this book, may be seen as the product of both ideological and strategic considerations. Values and beliefs serve as strong cognitive constraints in shaping actors’ choices. This explains why far right parties broadly share a sovereignty-based criticism of the EU, arguing that it undermines cherished national sovereignty (Vasilopoulou 2011). Policy problems deriving from European integration may be resolved through a process by which the nation-state would regain a level of control in some or all EU policies. In the context of party competition, however, strategic considerations may condition the extent to which far right parties oppose the EU. Starting from the premise that far right parties are rational actors (e.g. see Wagner 2012), this book argues that their Euroscepticism is conditional upon the dynamics of domestic party competition and the parties’ political agenda within their national party system. Each far right party crafts its unique EU policy niche in its domestic party system based on a careful balance between interest representation, electoral politics and party competition. Although far right parties share the core features of nationalism, authoritarianism and strong leadership, they tend to vary in terms of their relationship with democracy and the ways in which they view their position in the domestic party system, which is associated with their policy on European integration. Being true issue entrepreneurs, far right parties adopt and adjust their EU policy for electoral purposes.

How may we conceptualise far right party Euroscepticism? This book argues that far right parties may be categorised into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Gerring 2012: 144) patterns of opposition to European integration. These include the ‘rejectionist’, the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ patterns. This typology is constructed on the basis of four attributes, including the definition of Europe, the principle, the policy practice and the future building of European integration. Parties belonging to the rejectionist pattern of far right Euroscepticism are against the principle of member state co-operation within the EU framework, are intensely critical of the EU institutional and policy status quo and reject future EU political and economic integration altogether. Conditional Eurosceptics present a somewhat less monolithic position on the EU. They accept, by and large, the principle of member state co-operation at the EU multilateral level, but they voice criticisms of the EU policy practice and are averse to the extension of EU competence into new issue areas. The compromising Euroscepticism type comprises parties that support the principle of member state co-operation at the EU level, and view the EU’s policy practice through a comparatively less critical lens.

These different Eurosceptic patterns are explained through a novel theoretical framework that refers to far right party models. Anti-system far right parties tend to adopt a rejectionist Eurosceptic position. These parties employ the EU in order to criticise what they frame as the domestic pro-EU consensus. Such an adversarial strategy serves to polarise the electorate and undermine the legitimacy of the political system. Anti-liberal far right parties tend to adopt policies that allow them to retain their core base while at the same time broadening their electoral appeal. These parties adopt a conditional Eurosceptic position. They avoid radicalising their discourse and seek to accommodate the European issue within debates that they perceive to be close to the convictions of the median voter. Normalised far right parties tend to opt for a compromising position on European integration. These parties employ the EU issue as a tool for political entrenchment in the domestic party system. By appearing closer to potential coalition partners of the right, they seek to improve their potential for collaboration with other domestic political forces.

Euroscepticism does not only relate to how parties position themselves on the EU dimension. Beyond adopting dissimilar positions on the EU, far right parties may also differ in the specificities of their Eurosceptic framing of the EU, and the ways in which they construct their argumentation. In addition to the general sovereignty-based critiques, which are common across the party family, these parties tend to link their Euroscepticism to nation-specific questions or societal problems. Given that the far right’s nationalist ideology draws its resources from the national context more than any other party family, the specificities of far right Eurosceptic issue framing are associated to country-specific debates and may take a particularised tone and focus. This entails

that Eurosceptic argumentation is sensitive to national contexts. Eurosceptic issue framing also becomes accommodated into party politics as an element of domestic party competition.

THE FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE

Authors have employed a number of designations to refer to this party family. The most popular labels include extreme right (e.g. Hainsworth 2000a; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2000; Carter 2005; Bruter and Harrison 2011), radical right (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Minkenberg 2001; Norris 2005; Art 2011; Akkerman 2012; Immerzeel et al. 2015) and populist radical right (e.g. Mudde 2007; 2014; Dunn 2015). This book employs the term ‘far right’ as an umbrella term encompassing both the extreme and radical right variants of this party family (e.g. Cole 2005; Erk 2005; Ellinas 2010; Mudde 2010: 1169; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016). Although there is academic debate on the core characteristics that set far right parties apart from other party families, which in itself has been a subject of enquiry, this book suggests that these parties are defined by the core ideological doctrine of nationalism, authoritarian attitudes and strong leadership.

Mudde (2007) identifies a minimum and a maximum definition of this party family’s ideology. The minimum definition suggests that nationalism is central to and constitutive of these parties’ ideologies (see also Eatwell 2000; Rydgren 2007; Ellinas 2010: 29; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). Far right parties tend to be proponents of exclusive and restrictive forms of nationalism. They make ethnocentric appeals, creating dichotomies between ‘nationals’ and those who they portray as the enemies of the nation. Their ideology is rooted in the defence of the national interest and draws upon the nationalist political doctrine, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent (Gellner 1983). Their core mission is to protect national sovereignty from globalising forces, which they see as a threat to each nation-state’s independence and right to self-determination. Although the Eurozone crisis has made the economy more salient in these parties’ programmatic agenda, far right parties tend to primarily compete along the national identity axis.

According to the maximum definition, far right parties may also be defined by their authoritarianism (e.g. see Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Hainsworth 2008). This often refers to a non-democratic form of government, and tends to be juxtaposed to totalitarianism (e.g. Linz 2000). In the context of attitudes and political ideologies, right-wing authoritarianism may be defined using Altemeyer’s (1981) F-scale, i.e., conventionalism, authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission. Authoritarians tend to believe that all

members of the society should follow traditional norms and customs; seek to control behaviour through punishment; and are prone to accept established authorities, such as police, the government or a strong political leader. Authoritarians are predisposed to expressing intolerant and punitive attitudes under conditions of group threat (Dunn 2015: 368). Combined with exclusive nationalism, authoritarianism is associated with the support of strict law and order, the promotion of a return to the national/traditional way of life and opposition to immigration and policies promoting multiculturalism, which are seen as eroding national identity, culture and values.

Beyond nationalism and authoritarianism, the literature also points to populism as a key characteristic of the far right. Populist actors claim to speak on behalf of the ‘common people,’ differentiating them from the ‘corrupt elites’ (Mudde 2007). Those elites may vary from economic (multinational companies and banks), political (the establishment and the government) or cultural (intellectuals broadly defined, such as academics, journalists or writers). Some actors may go as far as presenting themselves and their movement as the embodiment of the people and its collective will, defending them against those perceived to be the enemies of the nation (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The centrality of populism to far right ideology has been contested, however, especially because there is no consensus on whether it constitutes an ideological feature (i.e., it defines a party’s deep core values) or whether it refers to a political communication style (e.g. see Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Mudde 2007). Other scholars go beyond this distinction and view charisma and strong leadership as an essential feature of populism (e.g. Germani 1978, Betz 1998: 9, Taggart 2000: 102, Eatwell 2002, Pedahzur and Brichta 2002). The formal organisational structures of far right parties tend to be similarly controlled by a powerful leader who is relatively unconstrained by the rest of the party (e.g. Zaslove 2004). This may be seen in terms of the personalisation of politics, i.e., the leader becomes the epitome of the party and ‘voters come to see parties [...] through a matrix of their leaders’ (Eatwell 2002: 19).

In sum, nationalism forms the core ideological feature of this party family. Beyond nationalism, far right parties also share a common authoritarian vision with regard to how society should be structured and organised. Although there is no academic consensus on the role of populism in far right ideology, these parties tend to be characterised by top-down organisation and strong leadership.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION

This book seeks to conceptualise, analyse and explain patterns of far right Euroscepticism. To do so, it adopts a comparative research design, drawing

upon literature in the fields of party politics, political behaviour and Euroscepticism. It combines the study of the wider universe of European far right parties with a controlled comparison of three parties in order to attain maximum analytical leverage. First, the three patterns of far right Eurosceptic opposition are examined through the empirical analysis of programmatic material of fourteen far right parties from eleven European democracies. Here, the focus is on the wider universe of far right parties in order to illustrate the empirical relevance of the three patterns. Subsequently, the book relies on a controlled comparison of three far right parties in order to construct a causal argument, linking types of Euroscepticism to far right party models. The controlled comparison follows the most similar systems design, in which ideologically similar parties exhibit variation in the dependent variable, namely that they belong to different patterns of Euroscepticism. This design allows for the detailed assessment of the dynamics that explain different party positions on European integration by ruling out competing explanations, and is able to generate both internal and external validity of the findings (Hancké 2009; Slater and Ziblatt 2013; see also Norris 2005: 36).

The controlled comparison consists of an analysis of the French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance. The comparison starts from the premise that because the parties under investigation belong to the same party family, they share specific characteristics, including nationalism, authoritarianism and strong leadership. These party features are held constant in the comparison, i.e., are not considered as potential explanations for the variation in a far right party's position on the EU. Despite sharing these three key characteristics, the three far right parties display strong variation in the dependent variable. To illustrate the comparability of the three cases, Table 1.1 presents party scores from the Chapel Hill expert survey on a number of questions and policy fields (Bakker et al. 2015). All three parties are strong supporters of tough measures to fight crime, similarly oppose liberal policies on social lifestyle, strongly favour assimilation and advocate nationalism. There is some small variation with regard to their stance towards immigration policy and ethnic minorities, with the Italian party being slightly more lenient. In both questions, however, all parties score very high and significantly above the middle value. They also score very highly on the GAL/TAN dimension, where GAL stands for green, alternative and libertarian; and TAN stands for traditional, authoritarian and nationalist values. This suggests that they similarly value order, tradition and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority over social and cultural issues.

The French National Front and the Greek LAOS are similarly populist in the sense that they are anti-elitist (e.g. Mudde 2007; Tsiras 2012). The National Alliance has avoided anti-elitist appeals as part of its modernisation strategy

Table 1.1 Far right party positions on the GAL/TAN dimension and individual policy dimensions

	<i>France</i> <i>FN</i>	<i>Greece</i> <i>LAOS</i>	<i>Italy</i> <i>AN</i>
Civil liberties vs. law and order	9.67	8.57	9.15
Social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality)	8.71	9.5	9.2
Immigration policy	8.57	9.75	7
Multiculturalism vs. assimilation	9.83	9.88	9.5
Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism	9.83	9.89	9.4
Ethnic minorities	10	8.38	7.2
GAL/TAN Dimension	9.25	9.63	8.88
EU position	1	2.38	4.75

Source: Chapel Hill Expert survey (Bakker et al. 2015).

Note: EU position is measured as the overall orientation of the party leadership in each survey year, where 1 denotes strongly opposed to 7 strongly in favour of European integration. Party scores on the remaining dimensions are measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where larger values indicate traditional, authoritarian and nationalistic positions. Data from 2006 are presented because this year includes all three parties' scores on all relevant dimensions.

(Ruzza and Fella 2009: 166). This variation is incorporated in the explanatory framework. Specifically, the 'attitude towards the polity' indicator suggests that while some far right parties may strive for the complete delegitimation of the system, others may seek to insert and establish themselves within that system. Crucially, all three parties are characterised by strong and personified leadership, which may be kept constant across the cases. The National Front's Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen (Eatwell 2002; Hainsworth 2008), LAOS's Georgios Karatzaferis (Dinas 2008; Tsiras 2012: 110) and the National Alliance's Gianfranco Fini (Lee 2000: 372; Hainsworth 2008; Griffin 2011: 203) have all been strong leaders of their respective parties.

Note that the relationship between nationalism and Euroscepticism is what differentiates far right parties from the mainstream (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). These parties' firm belief in the pursuit and maintenance of national self-determination links their nationalism to negative evaluations of European integration. The EU is viewed as a heterogeneous entity, which dilutes national sovereignty and seeks to assimilate European nation-states into a cultural melting pot, where each nation would lose its individuality. However, levels of nationalism do not vary enough within the party family in order to account for differences in the dependent variable, i.e., Euroscepticism. As shown in Table 1.1, whereas party scores on the cosmopolitanism versus nationalism question are all above 9 on an 11-point scale, scores on the EU dimension vary considerably. On a 7-point scale, they range from a strongly opposed 1 for the French National Front, to a comparatively less Eurosceptic 2.38 for the Greek LAOS, and a relatively pro-EU position for the Italian National Alliance at 4.75. Based on the typology of Euroscepticism proposed in this book, the French National Front may be categorised

within the ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic pattern, the Popular Orthodox Rally displays a ‘conditional’ type of Euroscepticism and the Italian National Alliance has adopted a ‘compromising’ EU stance.

This book seeks to explain far right party positions on the EU by examining the characteristics of the parties themselves, which are theorised through the framework of party model. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that party system incentives play a role in structuring party preferences. The three parties selected for the controlled comparison operate in countries that are dissimilar in many respects, but within the context of Western Europe they also share a number of important similarities. France, Greece and Italy are all ‘old’ Western EU member states, with fairly long lengths of EU membership. They similarly share a bipolar logic of party competition. This is defined based on Bartolini et al. (2004: 2), who suggest that ‘a party system is bipolar if (a) there are two poles – made up by either parties or coalitions – that get most of the votes; (b) one of these wins the absolute majority of the seats and forms the cabinet. A corollary to this definition is the following: third poles, that is parties or coalitions offering candidates against those of the main coalitions, are systematically underrepresented and unable to play a pivotal role’.

A majoritarian as opposed to a consensual logic underpins the workings of these three political systems. The dynamics of party competition are bipolar (either two-party or two-block) rather than multipolar. This is reinforced by different electoral systems that all tend to favour polarisation, i.e., double ballot in France, winner bonus in Greece and thresholds incentivising pre-electoral alliances in Italy (e.g. see Gallagher and Mitchell 2005). In France, the centre-left and centre-right are the main competing party blocs within the political system. Although the National Front evolved into an important force from the 2000s onwards, the party was systematically underrepresented (Grunberga and Schweisguth 2003; Bornschier and Lachat 2009). In Greece, the system has been characterised as polarised pluralism, either ‘limited’ (Mavrogordatos 1984) or ‘extreme’ (Seferiades 1986). It has evolved into a two-and-a-half party system, where two major parties have been associated with the left and right, respectively, and an additional third small party has been associated with the radical left (Legg and Roberts 1997: 132). Despite the fact that the Greek party system experienced fragmentation in the 2012 elections (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013), the 2015 general elections showed significant signs of citizen realignment and a return towards the predominance of two main political forces (Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2016). From the early 1990s onwards, Italy experienced a shift from consensual politics towards polarisation and strong political leadership. This marked the establishment of the Second Italian Republic, which is characterised by bipolar competition between two camps broadly associated

with the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ (Fella 2006: 13–14; see also Bartolini et al. 2004; Fabbrini 2009).

This similarity is important because the bipolar logic of competition becomes a constraint to far right party electoral success. The three-party systems broadly provide similar incentives to far right parties. Nonetheless, these incentives are not fixed, and a specific institutional context may provide both centrifugal and centripetal incentives, depending on how specific actors interpret them. In line with the perspective that views parties as political agents themselves, this book takes this point forward by arguing that (1) we should take political context into consideration as it structures party competition; but (2) we should not be viewing institutional incentives as static, providing fixed incentives to political competitors; because (3) the way in which political entrepreneurs interpret institutional incentives depends on the far right party model. Table 1.2 summarises the similarities among the three case studies.¹

It is worth mentioning that the Italian National Alliance has undergone dramatic transformation over the years. The party’s fascist past suggests that it is a core member of the far right party family (e.g. Hainsworth 2008: 6; Bruter and Harrison 2011: 2). Although the fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) reinvented itself in 1994/1995 as the National Alliance in order to integrate into the Second Republic, the party has had an ‘incomplete and contested trajectory towards a post-fascist identity’ (Hainsworth 2008: 11) with its ideology based on a nationalist platform opposing multiculturalism and immigration (Norris 2005: 64). The transformation resulted in a new ideological hybrid of ‘democratic fascism’ (Griffin 1996). At the 1995 Fiuggi Congress, the party officially changed its name into the ‘National Alliance’. This was no more than a change in the name rather than a change in political personnel, organisation and ideology (Ignazi 2003; Tarchi 2003). The Theses of the Congress ‘failed to acquire the status of a historic, path-breaking “manifesto” of the new party’ (Ignazi 2005: 337). An overwhelming majority of the 1995 Congress participants continued to positively evaluate fascism (Baldini and Vignati 1996; Ignazi 2003: 46). The new party also presented elements of continuity with regards to its organisational structure (Morini 2007: 160; Ignazi, Bardi et al. 2010: 200). In the 2000s the National Alliance party participated in the House of Freedoms coalition governments led by

Table 1.2 Comparability of case selection

	<i>National Front France</i>	<i>Popular Orthodox Rally Greece</i>	<i>National Alliance Italy</i>
Nationalism	High	High	High
Authoritarianism	High	High	High
Leadership	Strong	Strong	Strong
Party system logic	Bi-polar	Bi-polar	Bi-polar

Silvio Berlusconi, and in 2009 the party disbanded, following an agreement to join forces under the banner of People of Freedom. Fini stepped down from party leadership in 2008 after being elected to the post of President of the Chamber of Deputies, and was succeeded by Ignazio La Russa. Following the party's dissolution, a significant number of National Alliance politicians remained within the People of Freedom. The value of this case study lies in understanding whether and how a party's ambivalent transformation may have an impact upon its Euroscepticism. The 'post-fascist' National Alliance (Mudde 2014: 221) provides an interesting contrast to the French and Greek cases, which have not shown a similar willingness to normalise.²

PLAN OF THE BOOK

This introductory chapter has defined the core puzzle of the book, presented the theoretical framework and outlined the research design. Chapter 2 maps far right party positions on European integration. Based on the empirical analysis of programmatic material of fourteen far right parties from eleven European democracies, it categorises far right parties into the 'rejectionist', 'conditional' and 'compromising' patterns of Euroscepticism. Chapter 3 develops the theoretical argument, and proposes a link between Euroscepticism and far right party model. It explains that differences in far right party positions on the EU may be understood with reference to a party's relationship with democracy, its attitude towards the polity, its evolving relationship with the electorate and its behaviour towards competitors. The following chapters (4, 5 and 6) proceed with a detailed examination of the three patterns of far right Euroscepticism through the controlled comparison of the French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance. These three chapters follow a similar structure. They commence with a systematic analysis of each party's ideology and an in-depth examination of its Euroscepticism. They proceed by situating the party's Euroscepticism in the context of domestic institutional and electoral incentives. They finally examine Eurosceptic issue framing through the analysis of a wealth of party material and MEP speeches. The final chapter summarises the findings and revisits the book's central argument with reference to questions of internal and external validity. It discusses the wider relevance and broader contribution of this study, and assesses the implications of its findings for the future of European integration in light of developments related to Europe's political and economic crises.

The empirical analysis focuses primarily on the 1999–2014 period, which includes the EP's fifth, sixth and seventh EP terms. These fifteen years coincide with a large number of constitutional developments in the EU, including

enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, EU institutional and decision-making reform and the establishment of new supranational posts, such as a permanent President of the European Council and a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs. This period also covers the outbreak of the financial crisis, which has brought European solidarity into question and highlighted discussions over the stability and future of European integration. During these years, nationalist sentiment and opposition to the EU project have dramatically increased, and the far right has assumed a key role in fostering this Eurosceptic debate. A combination of empirical methods has been employed in order to collect and analyse data on far right party Euroscepticism. The study relies on elite interviews, expert surveys and the detailed analysis of party documents, voter data and content analysis of MEP speeches (see appendix for coding technique).