Introduction

The diverse make-up of modern societies has long been a major preoccupation of political philosophy. It has also been a prominent focus for public policy. How should a society provide for the differences exhibited by its population? Should it view them with indifference, or seek to diminish them in the interest of social cohesion, or view them as positive goods that it should facilitate or promote? The answer cannot be simple, partly because the differences captured by the terms 'difference' or 'diversity' are themselves so diverse. For example, how a society should respond to the different languages to be found amongst its population is likely to differ from the way in which it should respond to its population's different religious or other beliefs, which in turn will differ from its proper response to differences that arise from inequalities in the economic wellbeing or social status of its citizens. Nor are these merely intra-societal issues; given the global world in which we now live, they also arise as international or transnational issues.

The essays brought together in this volume focus on one sort of response to difference: toleration. They were written at different times and deal with different aspects of toleration, but they are characterised by a number of common themes.

One such theme concerns the idea of toleration itself. That idea has been analysed many times and I shall not present another formal analysis here. Fundamentally, we tolerate when we object to something but nevertheless refrain from impeding it. Religious faiths, for example, are conflicting as well as different in that they present rival bodies of belief. The adherents of one faith therefore have reason to disagree with and to disapprove of other faiths. Religious toleration requires those adherents not to prevent, or to seek to prevent, the practice of other faiths even though they have reason to disagree

with and disapprove of them. We tolerate when we refrain from impeding that to which we object; if we do not object, we have no occasion to tolerate.

Toleration is not therefore a response appropriate to every sort of difference. For example, we are often enjoined to celebrate cultural differences and that injunction can be entirely reasonable. Why should we not delight in rather than object to the music, literature, art, and cuisine of cultures other than our own? If we do respond to cultural differences with delight, they will make no call upon our toleration. Even if we do not positively approve of differences, we may respond to them with indifference. Others may possess preferences or pursue forms of life different from our own; why should that bother us? If we respond to differences with that sort of nonchalance, we shall again have no occasion to tolerate them. On the other hand, when cultures conflict rather than merely differ, as they sometimes do on matters of fundamental value, we may well find ourselves presented with questions of toleration. Moreover, what is an issue of toleration for some may not be for others. Same-sex relationships are matters of indifference for some and matters of dislike or disapproval for others. What *ought* to be a matter for toleration can be controversial simply because people have different views on what we can reasonably disapprove of or dislike. When differences present us with conflict rather than mere difference, they present us with more challenging instances of diversity and the idea of toleration is significant partly because it is a response to that more challenging case.

Contrary to the idea of toleration that I have outlined here, the terms 'toleration' and 'tolerant' are sometimes used nowadays in a more relaxed way. In this more generous usage, to tolerate is to accept. Tolerant people, rather than putting up with something to which they take exception, simply take no exception. They are open-minded and accepting of others, even though the beliefs and practices of others differ from her own. Rather than viewing people's differences negatively, they rejoice in them. That is not a conception of toleration I adopt. My reason is not that I reckon it to be linguistically mistaken; how can it be if it now figures in common usage? Rather I set it to one side because, if we remove disapproval or dislike from the idea of toleration, we lose what makes toleration distinctive, interesting, and demanding. In particular, we lose what is sometimes called the 'paradox of toleration': how can it be good or right not to prevent a preventable wrong? What is distinctive about toleration, traditionally conceived, is its combining two sorts of reason: reason to disapprove or dislike along with reason to refrain from impeding what we disapprove of or dislike.

What sort of reason, then, can be a reason for toleration? The answer to that question provides a second theme that runs through these essays. There are many different reasons why we might, or should, opt for toleration rather than intolerance. Some are prudential or strategic, such as an employee's

reason to tolerate his superior's objectionable conduct if he wants to gain her support in seeking promotion, or a country's reason to tolerate the short-comings of other countries if it wants to retain them as allies. Some apply to interpersonal relationships rather than to politics, such as the way in which toleration can help sustain those relationships. My interest is primarily in moral reasons for toleration. Those reasons can also be several rather than singular. They can include consequentialist reasons and reasons that appeal to human well-being. However, the reason to which I appeal most frequently is deontological, that is, to the moral status possessed by persons and to the respect and equal respect that we owe one another as persons. Persons, in virtue of being persons, are entitled to pursue their preferred forms of life and others are duty-bound not to prevent their so doing. Thus, on this deontological view, a person has a right to the toleration of others and others have a duty to respond accordingly. This mode of moral thinking is peculiarly well-suited to the duality of reasons that figure in toleration, since the reason it gives for toleration—the *status* of the tolerated—differs in kind from the reason that appraises the object of toleration negatively—the *demerit* of the tolerated's conduct. There will, of course, be limits to how much toleration this deonto-logical thinking demands but, given the equal status of persons on which it relies, it endorses the general idea that people should possess equal liberty to live as they choose consistently with the right of others to do the same.

The idea of toleration as something to which people are equally entitled, and which should be mutual and reciprocal, is well-suited to the contempo-rary democratic age and therein lies a third theme of these essays. My concern has been to examine toleration as an idea that relates to the present. That is not because I think the past does not matter. Rather it is because I mean to resist the idea that toleration belongs only to the past. Historically, toleration has been most associated with religious differences and a quick glance around the world exposes the nonsense of supposing that the battle for religious tol-eration has been fought and won. Even in societies whose populations have largely embraced the idea of religious toleration, toleration still matters as a continuing state of affairs. Moreover, as many societies have moved from being multidenominational to being significantly multifaith, their commit-ment to religious toleration has been increasingly tested. As I indicate in chapter 4, the issue now is often not only *whether* the practices of a religious faith should be tolerated but also *how* they should be tolerated.

Religious faith is, of course, only one of many contemporary sites of toleration and intolerance. Another, which is frequently intertwined with religious difference, is cultural difference. Cultural differences, as I have already indicated, need not always raise issues of toleration but they do when they present us with conflicting norms of conduct. They may also raise those issues for less profound and more contingent reasons such as the aversion

and suspicion with which people sometimes react to the unfamiliar and what they perceive as 'alien'. Consider too the importance of mutual toleration for the functioning of democratic political life or for peaceful coexistence both between societies and within them. Or consider how fundamentally important mutual toleration is for the conduct intellectual inquiry. Toleration may not be at issue in every case of difference, but it is no less relevant to the circumstances of the present than it was to those of the past.

A final theme that unites these essays is their focus on political or 'public' toleration. Their primary concern is with issues of toleration as these arise in the public life of societies rather than as they might arise in relationships between individual persons. The public/private distinction is notoriously difficult to draw satisfactorily and we run into that difficulty if we use it to distinguish different domains of toleration. We may readily describe as 'public' toleration that relates to law and to other institutions of the state, while toleration as it figures in one-to-one personal relationships may seem suitably described as 'private'. But how are we to categorize the toleration relevant to what are sometimes described as intermediate associations such as organized religions or universities or political parties, or to the looser but still highly significant associations that we often describe as 'communities'? If toleration is all of a piece so that political toleration is no different in character from person-to-person toleration, distinctions between different domains of toleration may be of little consequence. Toleration as it bears on the public life of a society is indeed frequently approached as though it were no more than an upscaled version of person-to-person toleration, so that we can understand 'public' toleration through the 'private' case. That, however, is an assumption I mean to question.

TOLERATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

The person-to-person model of toleration is not unsuited to all political circumstances. It is a model that translates easily to the political circumstances of early modern Europe. During that period, the prevailing form of government was monarchy and it was up to each monarch to decide whether he or she would tolerate subjects who practised a religion different from the monarch's own. The model does not transfer with similar ease to liberal democratic regimes. In a liberal democratic society, at least ideally conceived, citizens' religious freedom is not properly left at anyone's disposal, including a democratic majority or an elected government.

In chapter 1, I propose that, if we are to make sense of toleration as it figures in the idea of liberal democracy, we must abandon the ruler/subject model. We should conceive a liberal democratic society as one that

instantiates the ideal of toleration. It does so through rules and arrangements that secure people's freedom to live as they wish, while simultaneously denying them the freedom to prevent *others* living as they wish. The rules and arrangements do not themselves 'tolerate' anyone or anything. They stand in a third-party, rather than a second-party, relation to the population whose lives they govern and the toleration they secure is 'horizontal' rather than 'vertical' in form. They require citizens to tolerate one another and they set out the terms on which they are to be mutually tolerant. Political toleration so conceived is consistent with the liberty and the equality that we associate with liberal democracy.

As well as setting out and defending that analysis, the chapter seeks to refute Glen Newey's suggestion that political toleration is all but impossible in a democratic society. Newey's thesis is that a democratic government typically faces competing groups, each of which insists that its demands should be met and those of its rivals frustrated. For that reason, a government cannot simply opt for tolerance rather than intolerance; in tolerating the demands of one group, it must fail to tolerate the demands of another. I aim to show, contrary to Newey's scepticism, that the choices between toleration and intolerance do not have to sum to zero and that a democratic government can choose between more or less tolerant arrangements.[1]

While the argument of chapter 1 is not tied to the idea of state neutrality, it clearly has an affinity with that idea. In chapter 2, I examine the relationship between toleration and neutrality more closely, with particular reference to the liberal political philosophy of John Rawls.[2] For Rawls, pluralism is an essential feature of modern democratic societies. The citizens of those societies subscribe to different 'comprehensive doctrines', philosophical, religious or moral, and to different 'conceptions of the good' emanating from those doctrines. How should a society deal with those differences? Rawls's answer is that, politically, the society should not attempt to judge which doctrine or which conception is right or best. Rather, its proper business is to secure a just distribution of freedoms and resources amongst its citizens and leave it to citizens themselves to decide which doctrine they should embrace and which conception of the good they should use their freedoms and resources to pursue.

Rawls's conception of the just society as one that remains neutral between people's different comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good would seem a model of the politically tolerant society. Yet several commentators have suggested that the association of neutrality with toleration is mistaken. Toleration requires us to refrain from preventing what we disapprove of or dislike but, if we remain neutral, we shall neither disapprove nor dislike and so will have no occasion to tolerate. Hence, the critics conclude, rather than instantiating political toleration, the neutral state makes it superfluous.

My principal response to that objection is that it gets the relationship between toleration and neutrality the wrong way round. It is not neutrality that gives rise to toleration but toleration that makes the case for neutrality. The doctrines and conceptions of the good of Rawls's citizens are conflicting rather than merely different; they therefore provide reasons for mutual disapproval. Suppose we believe that, even so, citizens should be mutually tolerant of one another's ways of life, especially in the political domain. How might we achieve that? For Rawls the answer is by establishing a regime in which citizens may not use *any* of the instruments of political power either to promote or to disadvantage a particular doctrine or conception of the good, which is to say that political power should, as far as possible, remain neutral between citizens' comprehensive doctrines and their conceptions of the good. Thus, so far from displacing toleration, the neutral state is the offspring of an unusually thorough commitment to toleration.

Peter Balint has argued that my attempt to make sense of liberal democratic toleration is unsuccessful.[3] In replying to his objections in chapter 3, I emphasize the difference between our two conceptions of a tolerant society. My conception involves a clear distinction between setting the rules of the game and actually playing it. The architects of the rules do not tolerate anybody; they simply instantiate the ideal of toleration. It is the citizens who, in playing by those rules, engage in toleration. Logically, the architect of the regime of toleration could be a monarch or someone who is not a member of the society, such as Rousseau's legislator. However, it is more consonant with the idea of liberal democracy that citizens should construct the arrangements under which they themselves live. But, if they do, we must distinguish between citizens as architects of the regime, in which role they are not engaged in tolerating anyone, from citizens as members of the society living in accordance with that regime, in which role they stand in a tolerant relation to one another.

My liberal democratic conception of political toleration does, however, depart from the orthodox account of toleration in a crucial respect. Imagine three societies. Society X conforms to my tolerant liberal democratic society, in which citizens are legally at liberty to live their preferred forms of life and legally debarred from depriving others of that liberty. Society Y deems only one form of life legitimate and compels its member to comply with that single form. Society Z falls in between X and Y. It does not impose a single form of life upon its members, but neither does it require them to tolerate one another's chosen forms. It leaves them to tolerate or not as they themselves see fit. Some citizens opt to be tolerant, but most do not; they use violence and whatever other means they can find to prevent or impede lives of which they disapprove. Which of these societies is the more tolerant? The obvious answer is society X. But, if we insist, along with the orthodoxy, that people tolerate only insofar as they remain legally free not to tolerate—that is, only

insofar as they *choose* to tolerate—the answer must be society Z. Moreover, society X will rank as no more tolerant than society Y. Those conclusions are self-evidently absurd.

In chapter 4, I press the relevance of toleration to contemporary liberal democratic societies still further. Liberal democracies standardly ascribe to their citizens the right to freedom of religion. Yet what should be the precise make-up of that right remains controversial, especially in relation to religious accommodation. The term 'religious accommodation' generally describes an arrangement which takes account of features particular to a religious faith and makes special provision for them. The most conspicuous instances of religious accommodation are exemptions removing conflicts between laws and the demands of particular faiths. For example, many societies have laws requiring motorcyclists and construction workers to wear safety helmets. Those laws create difficulties for turban-wearing Sikhs and many societies remove those difficulties by exempting turban-wearing Sikhs from the relevant legislation. In European countries, the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief enunciated in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights has often been claimed as a ground for such accommodation. The US constitution's 'free exercise' clause has been invoked to similar effect. Another vehicle for accommodation is law providing against indirect religious discrimination in employment and in the provision of goods and services. A rule or practice is indirectly discriminatory when its effect, though not its purpose, is to disadvantage a group relative to others. A rule requiring employees to work at weekends, for example, discriminates indirectly against Orthodox Jews and Sabbatarian Christians; indirect discrimination law requires employers, unless they have adequate justification for doing otherwise, to exempt members of those religious groups from the rule. These various forms of exemption are, I argue, exercises in the toleration of religious differences, even though they are not commonly conceived in that way, and argument about whether they should exist and, if so, how generous they should be, is argument about the proper scope of religious toleration.

TOLERATION, BELIEFS, AND IDENTITIES

Toleration as a public issue arises most prominently in pluralist societies, that is, in societies characterized by what I have previously described as 'difference'. That pluralism includes differences in religious belief and in many other sorts of belief. Nowadays, however, the differences manifested by a population are frequently characterised in quite other terms: as differences of 'identity'. If we characterise a society's pluralism as a plurality of identities, how should that affect our thinking on toleration? Can we simply transpose

our thinking on toleration from beliefs to identities, or does the shift to identi-
ties alter the kind of toleration there should be? Is it even appropriate to think
of ourselves 'tolerating' identities?

In chapter 5, I examine the implications of recasting people's beliefs as
identities. These are by no means straightforward. For example, we might
suppose that ideas of the respect that is due to persons and of what matters to
their wellbeing will provide even stronger protection if we conceive beliefs as
constituents of people's identities. But those ideas might be used to opposite
effect. If our respect for a person's identity turns on their beliefs and if we
take a negative view of their beliefs, we shall take a negative view of their
identity. Similarly, if people's identity is essential to their wellbeing and if
someone's identity is grounded in beliefs that we reckon false, we may think
we should do whatever we can to reshape their beliefs so that their identity
becomes more conducive to their wellbeing.

Some commentators have suggested that, if we think of people's differ-
ences as differences of identity, we should treat those differences as public
rather than private matters; our strategy should be democratic rather than
liberal. I argue the opposite. The more we characterize beliefs as matters of
identity, the more that pushes us towards privatizing belief. Of course, the
privatizing of religious belief is a strategy commonly used for securing the
toleration of those beliefs, but we need to be aware of differences in what
'privatizing' can mean. Liberal societies secure toleration by privatizing reli-
gious belief only in that, as far as possible, they keep religious belief out of
the domain of public political decision making. People are then free to pursue
whatever religious beliefs they embrace, which may be none, and they will
not be subject to the political imposition of beliefs they do not share. That
arrangement is quite consistent with religious beliefs remaining public in a
different respect. Religious adherents are still free to preach and promote
their faith to the world at large and nonadherents remain free to dispute their
claims. If, however, we recast religious beliefs as identities, we make them
matters that are entirely personal and private to their holders. An identity,
unlike a belief, is not true or false, or plausible or implausible, and the make-
up of an identity, unlike a belief, is not properly of concern to those who do
not share it.

The principal normative thrust of my concern with the shift from beliefs to
identities is the threat it poses to freedom of expression. Beliefs of the kind at
issue here embody claims about what is true of the world and about the way
in which we should conduct our lives. The content of those beliefs makes
them everyone's business and suitable subjects for scrutiny and comment
by anyone. But, if we reconstrue beliefs as identities, we make possible a
potent argument—the 'identity argument'—for severely restricting freedom
of expression. It runs as follows: My beliefs are essential to my identity, to

the very person I am. Hence, if you attack my beliefs, you attack me. Such personal assaults are intolerable. Identities should be respected rather than attacked or eroded and assaults on identities should be deplored and discouraged, perhaps through the use of criminal law. Thus, by translating beliefs into identities, we can create a disturbing case for silencing critical commentary on beliefs, be they religious or nonreligious.

The identity argument was mobilized during the Rushdie Affair by Rushdie's critics, both Muslim and non-Muslim. In chapter 6, I examine its use in the context of that affair and indicate its sinister implications not only for those who, like Rushdie, want the freedom to question and criticize religious beliefs, but also for religious believers insofar as they demand that we take their beliefs seriously as beliefs. That demand is at odds with the notion that what really matters about beliefs is their impact on their holders' identities. Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* was published in 1988 and the affair it triggered has now passed into history, but the issues it raised are still with us, as is illustrated all too well by the furore sparked during 2005–2006 by the Danish cartoons of Muhammad and the murder in 2015 of journalists and others associated with the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*.

The idea of identity is frequently combined with that of 'recognition'. An assertion of identity is typically accompanied by a call for positive public recognition of its status or value. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti has proposed that, in contemporary Western societies, we should reconceive toleration as recognition.[4] The kinds of minority that currently lack recognition and that, she argues, should receive it are Muslims in Western societies and homosexuals. Examples of measures she believes would bestow toleration as recognition, albeit symbolically, are legal changes enabling Muslim girls to wear hijabs while attending French state schools, and reforms instituting same-sex marriage and enabling openly gay people to join the military.

The idea of 'toleration as recognition' does, however, harbour a problem which I examine in chapter 7. As we have seen, toleration traditionally conceived entails a negative appraisal of whatever we tolerate and Galeotti means that negativity to remain part of her revised conception of toleration. Recognition, by contrast, requires positive endorsement of the identity we recognize. How, then, can we simultaneously tolerate and recognize? Does one not rule out the other?

I argue that we can square this circle only if our recognition takes a 'mediated' form. Suppose I am a Christian and I am called upon to accord recognition to Muslims. I cannot accord unmediated recognition to an Islamic identity, since I must believe it to be based on a false religion. I can, however, recognize that people who are Muslim are also, like me, persons or citizens and I can accept that, as persons or citizens, what matters to them should matter equally with what matters to myself. In other words, my recognizing them

as persons or citizens provides reason for my recognizing that, as Muslims, they should enjoy the same civic status and the same rights as I do. That is how I, as a disapproving Christian, might accord recognition to those possessing a Muslim identity. For Galeotti, however, that sort of mediated recognition is not enough. She, like Charles Taylor,[5] insists that minorities should receive unmediated recognition; we should accord recognition to Muslims *as* Muslims and to gays *as* gays. But, in circumstances of disagreement and disapproval that create a need for toleration, that demand is unreasonable as is readily apparent if we combine Galeotti's two prime examples of unrecognised minorities. Given the negativity with which homosexuality is viewed within traditional Islam and in the orthodox versions of many other faiths, how can we insist that the adherents of those faiths must accord positive recognition to gays as gays? And, insofar as a gay identity is viewed negatively by a religious faith and its adherents, how can we expect gays to accord positive recognition to that faith and its adherents?

DOUBT, DISAGREEMENT, AND VALUE PLURALISM

Do we have reason to tolerate those with whom we disagree because, in that disagreement, they could be right and we could be wrong? John Stuart Mill certainly thought so.[6] Many defenders of toleration have, by contrast, shunned any suggestion that doubt or scepticism should figure in the justification of toleration. One reason for that shunning stems from the simple conceptual point that we tolerate x only if we believe x to be objectionable; if we refrain from preventing x because we are uncertain whether x is indeed objectionable, we are not really tolerating x. Another reason is that, if we found the case for toleration on scepticism, that scepticism may corrode the case for toleration itself. If we cannot be sure of anything, how can we be sure that we are right to be tolerant?

In spite of those objections, a degree of modesty about our own wisdom and others' lack of it can be part of a coherent case for toleration. That applies especially to the case of religious toleration. Many religious faiths are founded on 'revealed truths', which are usually truths said to be revealed in their sacred writings. Unfortunately, different religions lay claim to different revealed truths and, since we have little to go on apart from each religion's claim, we have no ready way of determining which revelation, if any, is correct. We therefore have reason to hold that no religion is sufficiently well-grounded epistemically to be justifiably imposed on those who reject it.

In chapter 8, I argue that the ideas of reasonable doubt and reasonable disagreement have a significant role to play in the dominant forms of contemporary liberal thinking. I preface that argument with a distinction between

two kinds of conflict: conflicts of want and conflicts of belief. Insofar as a conflict is merely one of wants, it is not an epistemic conflict. All we have to determine is how the conflict can be fairly provided for. With beliefs it is a different matter. Beliefs are about what is true or false, right or wrong, prudent or imprudent, and so on. Beliefs are capable of being correct or incorrect, or more or less correct. Thus, people do not obviously have an interest in holding and acting on their beliefs merely because those beliefs are their own; they have a more obvious interest in holding and acting on correct beliefs. The appropriate collective response to a conflict of beliefs is not obviously therefore a liberal response. Believers have a more obvious interest in trying to establish which of their different beliefs is actually correct or best-founded. Only if they fail in that endeavour do they have reason to cast around for some other way of dealing with their differences. Thus, the presence of justified doubt and reasonable disagreement is crucial to the case for dealing with conflicting beliefs in a liberal fashion. I argue that that claim holds good whether the liberal solution on offer is the deontological liberalism associated with John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin or the perfectionist liberalism exemplified by the work of Joseph Raz.[7]

Even if scepticism can be mobilized in defence of toleration, there are other defences which can seem less hazardous. One such is value-pluralism. Value-pluralism is a theory about the nature of value. It holds that values are irreducibly plural and, in significant measure, uncombinable and incommensurable. It therefore rejects the idea that all that is of value can be reduced to a single ultimate value, such as utility, or that different values can be organized into a single correct hierarchy. It also holds that there are many good forms of life rather than only one and that, since many goods are uncombinable, not all them can be realized in a single life or even in a single society. Value-pluralism should not be confused with relativism or subjectivism. It does not deny the objectivity of values or that good can be distinguished from evil. It denies only that the good is singular and that one form of life is uniquely or supremely good.

Given its commitment to the diversity of values and good forms of life, value-pluralism would seem to yield a strong case for toleration. In chapter 9, I consider whether it does by examining the thought of John Gray, who has provided one of the most fully developed statements of value-pluralism, including its application to political life.[8] Gray argues that, given the truth of value-pluralism, differences and conflicts of value are unavoidable and that we can achieve peaceful coexistence, socially and globally, only by way of a modus vivendi based on compromise and toleration. However, the path from value-pluralism to toleration is less easily taken than Gray seems to suppose. If we manage to convince people of the truth of value-pluralism, they will not take a negative view of (good) forms of life other than their own

and therefore will have no need to tolerate them. On the other hand, each of
those people will commit to the goodness of a particular form of life and that
specific commitment may be hard to combine with a general commitment to
value-pluralism. In addition, value-pluralism is a theory about the plurality of
goods rather than about the plurality of *conceptions* of the good, and it does
not easily cater for conflict that stems not from the diversity of values but
from people's diverse and conflicting judgements about what is of value. A
theory of toleration needs to provide for what, following Rawls, I describe as
'the fact of pluralism': the fact that people subscribe to different and conflict-
ing conceptions of the good, many of which are at odds with the claims of
value-pluralism as an ethical or meta-ethical theory. Religious conceptions
are an obvious case in point. It is difficult to see how people whose beliefs
are at odds with value-pluralism might nevertheless embrace value-pluralism
as a reason for toleration.

TWO SPECIAL CASES

The final two essays examine more specific issues, though still issues on
which much depends. Chapter 10 considers whether speech can be intoler-
ant. Chapter 11 examines how we might apply the idea of toleration to the
international world.

Speech figures in discussions of toleration most commonly as a possible
object of toleration. If we dislike or disagree with what others say, we con-
front the question of whether we should nevertheless tolerate their speech
and, if we should, up to what point. Chapter 10 considers a quite different
relationship between speech and toleration: whether speech itself can be an
instrument of intolerance. Speech is often thought to be less capable than
action of limiting the freedom of others and that is sometimes said to justify
giving people greater freedom of speech than freedom of action. That, in turn,
may suggest that speech is an unlikely instrument of intolerance. On the other
hand, if one person denounces the conduct of another, that very denunciation
may seem intolerant.

If speech expresses dislike or disapproval, should it be deemed intolerant
merely for that reason? Given that we tolerate only what we disapprove of or
dislike, it would be extravagant to hold that we are tolerant only if we never
disclose our disapproval or dislike. But there are other ways in which speech
might reasonably be deemed intolerant. It is, for example, if it is part of an
effort to persuade legislators to prevent conduct of which the speaker disap-
proves. Speech might also be used deliberately to cause hurt and distress to
those we disagree with or dislike, in which case it is intolerant because it aims
to persuade rather than to impede. The cases on which it is more difficult to

rule are social disapproval and proselytizing. Even if mere disapproval cannot itself be accounted intolerance, the sheer weight of social disapproval might inhibit people's conduct so that disapproval does function as an instrument of intolerance, whether justified or not. Proselytising is not normally deemed intolerant, even though it endeavours to change people's minds rather than settle for 'live and let live'. Yet proselytising might also take a form that amounts to intolerance. I suggest that we should look to the idea of autonomy for the test of what is and is not consistent with toleration. Proselytizing and expressing disapproval are consistent with toleration, but only so long as they take forms that do not subvert people's capacity to decide for themselves and to act as they decide.

The literature on toleration has focused overwhelmingly on either inter-personal relationships or domestic political arrangements. Only rarely has it turned to the case of international politics. In chapter 11, I examine how the idea of toleration might be deployed internationally. What distinguishes the international case is that the subjects and objects of toleration are corporate or collective entities: states or societies or peoples. The idea of *international* toleration is therefore different from that of *global* toleration which would focus on humanity as a whole without reference to political units.

There are plenty of reasons of a strategic kind why a society might opt to tolerate another society's objectionable conduct or arrangements, but my interest is in the application of moral rather than prudential reasons to the international case. More especially, I consider whether we might invoke the moral status of persons, and the respect they are due, as reasons for interna-tional toleration. Rawls is well known for grounding international toleration in that sort of deontological thinking.[9] However, for Rawls, the subjects and objects of international toleration are Peoples rather than persons. Peoples, as he conceives them, are not reducible to persons; they possess moral standing in their own right, a standing that is independent of the persons they encom-pass. Contrary to Rawls's thinking, I propose a conception of a People that is 'collective' rather than 'corporate'. According to that conception, the rights of a People are rights held jointly by the persons who constitute its members. The moral standing that underwrites those rights is that of the persons who jointly hold them rather than a standing that belongs to a People indepen-dently of its members. So understood, our reasoning about international toleration can be anchored in persons along with the status they possess and the respect they are owed.

A major subject of People-to-People toleration is cultural difference. If those differences are proper objects of toleration, why is that? People often turn to cultural relativism for an answer. Whether it yields an answer depends on the kind of relativism it is. A relativism that holds that there is no correct morality but only different sets of norms evolved by different segments of

humanity can undermine intolerance by undermining the claim to correct belief on which that intolerance is based. But it provides no case against one culture's imposing itself upon another for other sorts of reason, such as a wish to dominate or to exploit. Appealing to the 'good' of different cultures is also ineffective insofar as cultures differ over what is good. The idea of person-hood provides a more compelling ground for international cultural toleration. Cultures matter primarily because they matter to those whose cultures they are and, insofar as we should tolerate cultures, the principal reason lies in the moral status of those who bear them rather than in the merits of the cultures themselves.

The idea of the equal status of persons, along with the equal respect they are due, does, of course, set limits to toleration; but those limits are, I argue, often drawn too closely. Respect for persons argues for government that possesses popular legitimacy but not necessarily for democracy. Moreover, if a population sincerely embraces a system of belief in which its members possess different statuses, the equal respect we owe them requires us to respect their system of belief, including arguably their beliefs about their differences in status.

Toleration is not an unmixed good simply because there are limits to what we should tolerate. Where precisely those limits should fall is often controversial, but the proposition that there should be no limits to toleration is indefensible. It equates with the claim that we should be free to do just anything, including to one another. We might defend the proposition by insisting that toleration remains toleration only so long as it is justified; we do not engage in toleration if we tolerate the intolerable. But that is no more than verbal duplicity. If we hold, for example, that people should not be free to engage in paedophilia, our stance, honestly stated, is that paedophilia is intolerable and should not be tolerated. Intolerance does not cease to be intolerance simply because it is justified.

Nowadays, the desirability of toleration is sometimes questioned in a less qualified and more fundamental way. Negativity, in the form of disapproval or dislike, is an essential feature of toleration traditionally conceived. Is that negativity not unfortunate and, if it is, should we not aim for something more and better than toleration? 'If tolerance is about objection, aversion, error, deviation, falsehood, I don't see how it gives you a positive notion of difference', complains Wendy Brown.[10] But, if we were to dispense with toleration, we would find ourselves having to dichotomize the world between the good or the right, which we should embrace and promote, and the bad or the wrong, which we should reject and suppress. No space would remain for the possibility that we can have reason to find something mistaken or objectionable but also reason not to prevent or impede it. As long as we continue to differ and to disagree, sincerely and reasonably, it is hard to see how we can do better

than take seriously the case for toleration. Without it, disputants can reach too easily for the words of Bishop Bossuet: 'I have the right to persecute you because I am right and you are wrong'.[11]

NOTES

1. For further comment on this issue, see Glen Newey, 'Political Toleration: A Reply to Jones', *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (2011): 223–27, and Peter Jones, 'Political Toleration: A Reply to Newey', *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (2011): 445–47. Newey went on to develop a fuller critique of the sort of position I adopt in his *Toleration in Political Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially chapter 5.

2. The fundamental place occupied by toleration in Rawls's thinking is most readily apparent in his *Political Liberalism*, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

3. Peter Balint, 'Not Yet Making Sense of Political Toleration', *Res Publica* 18 (2012): 259–64. For Balint's more comprehensive thinking on toleration, see his *Respecting Toleration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

4. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, *Toleration as Recognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

5. Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) and 'The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Gutman, ed., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

6. Especially in his *On Liberty*, chapter 2.

7. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) and *Political Liberalism*; Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) and *Sovereign Virtue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

8. See especially, John Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

9. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

10. Wendy Brown and Rainer Forst, *The Power of Tolerance: A Debate*, edited by Luca Di Blasi and Christopher F. E. Holzhey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 67.

11. Quoted in Susan Mendus, *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 7.