

Chapter 1

Introduction

All advanced capitalist countries admit entry to some immigrants but refuse entry to others. Policies and practices range from active invitation or legal admission to mere tolerance or outright rejection of the people who wish to enter these countries. The reasons for individuals to seek entry also vary from the need to find a safe haven to the wish to reunite with one's family or to work in order to create a better future. Despite the fact that all advanced capitalist countries accept some, but not all, potential immigrants, the variation when it comes to the admission of foreigners – or immigration policy – is considerable.¹ Not only does the overall scale of immigration vary considerably, but states also differ in the relative importance attached to the previously mentioned reasons for migration. Some states accept large numbers of labour migrants but small numbers of refugees, whereas the opposite is true for others. Moreover, immigration policies and patterns show variation over time.

The aim of this book is to shed light on this variation by developing and testing a novel explanation for immigration admission. It is argued that institutions in the areas of labour market policy and welfare policy can shape immigration policy to an important extent. The leaning of labour markets and welfare states – towards the more inclusive or the more exclusive – can be reflected in policies towards labour immigrants and forced immigrants, respectively, pushing them towards the more inclusive or the more exclusive. Apart from developing this argument theoretically, the book offers a rich empirical analysis of the connection between national institutions and international migration, using a variety of data and methods. Together these analyses provide support for the theoretical argument: this book shows that during the time period studied, immigration policy did not stand independent from labour market and welfare state institutions.

A central point of departure for this study is that in order to understand variation in immigration patterns, we need to pay attention to, and develop different explanations for, different types of immigration. Consequently, although at the most general level the institutional explanation contains one argument – that national institutions have an impact on the admission of international migrants – at a more specific level, two arguments are presented. These two arguments focus to different degrees on institutions' roles in *providing incentives* and in *building norms* and they apply to two different sorts of migration: labour immigration and forced immigration.

Building on a comprehensive literature of labour markets and immigration, it is first suggested that institutional arrangements in the area of labour market policy will influence the relative importance of labour immigration to a country. Whereas economic theory suggests a general need for foreign labour in any advanced capitalist state, this institutional argument suggests that the perceived need for foreign labour will depend on the institutional setting: labour immigration will be more important in economies with liberal labour market institutions than in more regulated labour markets. More specifically, it is suggested that decentralised bargaining, a weak position for unions and a lack of active labour market policies are likely to lead to higher levels of labour immigration. The suggested mechanisms behind this effect are that labour market institutions can lessen the demand for, and provide alternatives to, foreign labour and that they can provide advocates for and opponents to labour immigration with different chances of success.

Whereas this institutional (labour market) argument focuses on the role of institutions in promoting a specific incentive structure to which actors adjust, the second argument instead relies heavily on the norm-building aspects of institutions. Drawing on theories from the comparative welfare state literature, it is suggested that comprehensive welfare state institutions will have a positive effect on the admission of forced migrants – that is, refugees and asylum seekers. There are three features of comprehensive welfare state institutions that could steer policies towards forced migrants in a more open direction. First, these institutions have been shown to impact on the boundaries of social solidarity. Second, they enhance generalised trust. And third, they can impact on the citizens' view of what the state should and can do in terms of protecting individuals. It is argued that under the right circumstances such norms and expectations stemming from welfare state institutions can influence policies towards refugees and asylum seekers.

One could argue that it is counter-intuitive that welfare state institutions should have any impact at all on forced migration. Refugee conventions naturally do not take into account domestic institutional characteristics of receiving countries, and asylum applications *should* be assessed solely with regard to the merit of the application. Yet, as we shall see, the variation among

countries when it comes to the admittance of forced migrants is substantial. This study sheds light on that variation.

Notably, the expectation that comprehensive welfare state institutions will lead to more open policies towards forced migrants runs counter to what is often suggested in the migration literature, from which one easily gets the impression that the relation between welfare state institutions and migration is one fraught with conflict, a situation often captured in the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990). This study challenges a specific claim from the welfare chauvinism theory – namely, that generous welfare state institutions will lead to more restrictive immigration policies – both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it points to how comprehensive welfare state institutions, through their effects on norms of solidarity, trust and perceptions of state capabilities, can work to the benefit of forced migrants rather than the other way around. Empirically, it shows that, contrary to what the welfare chauvinism thesis makes us expect, comprehensive welfare state institutions do not have a negative, but instead a significant positive, effect on the intake of forced migrants to a country.

EXPLAINING IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION

As mentioned earlier, a central point of departure for this investigation is that when studying immigration policy we should distinguish between different types of immigration. Another is that we should make more active use of theory in our empirical investigations, since this has been identified as a weak spot in empirical research on immigration. For example, Eytan Meyers argues that ‘the greatest weakness of most literature on immigration control policy is that it does not relate to any theoretical approach’ (Meyers 2004: 9; see also Massey et al. 1998).

Scholars who have aimed at making an inventory of the theories that do exist are not in agreement about which the important ones are (Freeman and Kessler 2008: 656–57). Still, it seems fair to say that two major approaches have explained immigration and/or immigration policy either from an economic perspective, according to which it is expected to be a response to economic incentives, or from a ‘cultural’ or historical framework, according to which old paths are still followed by new migrants (Bartram 2005; Castles and Miller 2003; Hollifield 2008; Hooghe et al. 2008).

The economic (or sometimes neoclassical) theories of immigration is built on the early work of Ravenstein (1885, 1889), who argued that the major reason for migration was the ‘desire inherent in most men to “better” themselves in material respects’ (Ravenstein 1889: 286). The economic strand of theory

essentially sees immigration as a scarce resource (labour) that is allocated across international boundaries (Borjas 1989; Chiswick 2008). It focuses on relative labour market demand, wage differences or other economic incentives as explanations for immigration patterns. Migrants will go where labour shortages occur or wages are higher. This line of thought about international migration has been criticised for being economic and simplistic and for neglecting the social aspects of migration (Bartram 2005; Castles and Miller 2003).

A quite different set of theories stresses the unique historical experiences in a country as the main determinants of immigration policy (Meyers 2000: 1251). Of particular importance, according to this view, is the experience of settler countries or 'immigrant nations' in which immigration can be placed within a positive national immigration mythology (Lynch and Simon 2003). Having been built by immigrants, their 'institutionalized politics favors expansionary policies and is relatively immune to sharp swings in direction' (Freeman 1995: 881), and consequently they continue to accept large-scale immigration (Meyers 2000: 1253–54).

Like settler experience, a colonial history is often highlighted within the historical approach to immigration theory. This factor is stressed particularly within the 'world systems theory' approach, a historical-structural line of thought building on the work of Wallerstein (1974) and according to which immigration will occur between 'peripheral' and 'core' nations (Massey et al. 1998; Morawska 1990; Portes and Walton 1981; Sassen 1988). Whereas a settler history is expected to lead to generally more open immigration policies, a colonial history is thought to be particularly important in explaining which countries of origin will dominate the influxes to particular countries, since immigration will be likely to occur in particular between past colonial powers and their former colonies (Massey et al. 1998: 41).

Both the economic and the historical perspective on immigration can claim some merit (Hooghe et al. 2008), and they have certainly added to our understanding of migration patterns. However, while the economic perspective is strong when it comes to explaining fluctuations over business cycles, it is often less suited to explaining variation between countries (Bartram 2005). And although the historical perspective is strong in terms of explaining long-standing differences between some countries, it is less useful in explaining developments over time, failing to explain why many countries without settler experience or a colonial history have over the years become major immigrant recipients.

Another approach, one that could potentially explain variation both across countries and over time, concerns the impact of political parties on immigration. A large part of this research concerns the presence and impact of radical right parties, whereas, even more recently, the impact of mainstream

parties – which have been surprisingly neglected in immigration research – has been highlighted (see e.g. Gudbrandsen 2010).

While acknowledging the role played by political parties, this study focuses on the institutional setting in which parties – and other policy actors in society – develop their policy positions and act to reach their policy goals. This institutional framework focuses more on stability than the purely economic framework but is more open to change than the historical framework.

At the most basic level, institutions are a structural feature of society which transcend individuals and show stability over time. Their importance in shaping political life is often highlighted by social scientists, and the role of institutions in explaining immigration policy has now been highlighted in several studies (see e.g. Bommers and Geddes 2000; Bucken-Knapp 2009; Cerna 2016a; Geddes 2003; Hollifield 1992; Money 1999; Togman 2002). Examples of institutionalist accounts include studies of how courts have a liberalising effect on immigration (Joppke 1998b, 2001), how electoral arrangements interact with economic conditions (Money 1999) and how the view on international migration (as an asset or a burden) is influenced by the perspective of domestic institutions such as those of the welfare state (Geddes 2003). In a well-known study, Soysal (1994) highlights the norm-building aspect of institutions and suggests that norms stemming from the international human rights regime have changed the meaning of citizenship in immigrant-receiving states.

The institutions of principal interest to this study – labour market and welfare state institutions – are central to comparative political economy and comparative welfare state research, respectively. In both of these fields, institutional theory has gained almost hegemonic status: in the field of political economy through the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), and in the field of welfare state research through the work on welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998).

For reasons which will be elaborated in the next chapter, both of these fields are likely to have a bearing on immigration policy. Still, ‘Neither the “varieties of capitalism” literature nor welfare-state typologies have systematically considered the implications of their models for responses of firms or states to international migration’ (Freeman and Kessler 2008: 668; but see Bucken-Knapp 2009; Cerna 2016a; Menz 2009). Although this book in many ways deviates from the focus on regimes that is so strong in these two lines of research, its focus on institutions in the areas of labour market and welfare state policy intends to offer a contribution to the fields of comparative political economy and welfare state research, where dependent variables other than immigration policy are normally highlighted.

Another contribution of this book is an account of how institutions can have very different effects on different kinds of immigration policies depending

on the nature of the policy areas involved. It might sound like a truism that policies towards different kinds of migration require different explanations and that an undifferentiated notion of ‘immigration’ is problematic. Still, in the migration literature, there is sometimes a tendency to fail to explicitly differentiate between different kinds of immigration, or (especially when it comes to economic explanations) to assume that ‘immigration’ equals labour immigration.² This is unfortunate, since the type of immigration is likely to determine the relative influence of different factors on immigration policy (see Meyers 2004). Arguably, the procedure for handling ‘immigration’ as a single phenomenon – which obscures important variations between receiving countries – can have consequences for our understanding of immigration policies in the advanced industrial democracies. As we shall see, studying different sorts of immigration at the same time makes it clear that it is often overly simplistic to speak of ‘liberal’ and ‘restrictive’ immigration countries generally (see Beine et al. 2016 for a similar observation). The relative strictness often depends on the type of immigration in focus.³

Although there is a multitude of reasons for people to move between countries, it is common to distinguish between three main types of migration: labour migration, forced migration (asylum seekers and refugees) and family migration (Gudbrandsen 2012; Sasse and Thielemann 2005).⁴ More recently, migration under free movement agreements, such as within the European Union (EU), has emerged as a major new category of migration which includes people with different motivations for migrating.

This study deals with labour immigration and forced immigration.⁵ These categories have been chosen for two reasons. First, they have during the past decades been the two major types of primary immigration where states control entry. Whereas family migration results from different sorts of primary migration, immigration under free movement regimes is by definition a category over which governments have less influence since it results from previously made international agreements. Second, they are the two categories that are most interesting from the point of view of the theoretical framework. The argument focuses on both the incentive-creating and the norm-building aspects of institutions, and it focuses on institutions in the labour market and the welfare state area. Of the different kinds of immigration, labour immigration is the type that is most likely to be influenced by the incentive structure that different labour market institutions provide. Forced migration, on the other hand, is the kind of immigration that is most likely to evoke a norm-based institutional response.

To explain why this is expected, a brief discussion is required about the framing of these different kinds of immigration and how they are interpreted and perceived. Policy frames serve as cognitive maps which point actors towards ‘causal and normative judgments about effective and appropriate

policies' within a policy area (Bleich 2002: 1063). Discussing framing in the immigration context, Statham and Geddes (2006) argue that political action does not follow directly from objective interests but is dependent on how these interests are defined and constructed:

Collective mobilisation is not a direct outcome of the distributed costs and benefits of immigration policies, but of the extent and way immigration is politicised and publicly mediated, and how certain positions are made to appear more feasible, reasonable, and legitimate, compared to alternative definitions of political reality. (Statham and Geddes 2006: 251–52)

The notion of framing thus implies that our responses to a certain phenomenon will depend on how that phenomenon is perceived. Since the argument in this study assumes that there can be a wide range of responses – from ideas about economic rationality to ideas about what is morally right – it is incompatible with a perception that people are guided *either* by self-interest *or* by norms (Bergmark et al. 2000: 240). Rather, it is in line with the perception of 'dual utilities' (Rothstein 1998). It is expected that various kinds of responses are possible, and that framing gives a clue to which responses are more likely than others. The framing of an issue has an impact on what will be seen as a legitimate response and on what arguments are considered relevant. In the area of immigration policy, framing could, for example, have an impact on whether norm-based arguments are seen as relevant, or whether arguments about economic rationality will dominate. The kind of immigration in focus is likely to be highly relevant in this regard. What, then, can be considered the frames of the respective policy areas?

When labour immigration is considered, it is generally the economic interest of the receiving nation that is in focus. Whether it is an answer to specific labour shortages or a more general effort to increase the labour supply, all labour immigration is meant to benefit the recipient country economically in one way or the other. Since the purpose of labour immigration is first and foremost to serve the interests of the receiving country, it is less likely that this issue will be framed in terms of a *moral responsibility* on behalf of the state towards the labour migrants themselves. Few argue that potential receiving states have responsibilities towards prospective labour migrants. When the rights of the labour immigrant is discussed, this normally concerns the conditions under which the foreign worker lives and works once he or she has been allowed entry, and not the right of entry itself. Except for the labour migration that takes place under free movement regimes or other specific agreements between states, receiving states are not obliged to accept labour migrants.

Since the interest of the receiving state is involved from the outset, labour immigration is likely to activate politics of *interest*. When policymakers are

to decide upon policies for labour immigration, they are likely to look at the domestic labour market needs, the employers' interest in hiring foreign workers and sometimes – depending on their institutionalised power – the position taken by unions.

While the policy frame 'by default' in discussions about labour immigration concerns the economic consequences for the receiving country, the reception of forced migrants has a very different starting point. The refugee regime, codified in the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (often referred to as the Geneva Convention) and its 1967 Protocol, clearly allocates *rights* to individuals and *responsibilities* to states (Donkoh 2000). The refugee regime, moreover, is based on the idea of moral equality between individuals, manifested in human rights and the universal applicability of such rights, as well as on principles of international solidarity and cooperation. This codification of principles and norms at the international level is, at the national level, backed up with the commitment of states to grant protection (Lavenex 2001).

All major states are signatories to the Convention, and according to Sales, this 'recognises a humanitarian motive for entry that is at variance with the economic self-interest that governs most immigration policy in increasingly explicit terms' (Sales 2007: 5). An important element in the international refugee protection regime articulated in the Convention is that the issue of refugee protection should be seen as a social and humanitarian one. It also frames the refugee issue as one of international solidarity in that it is based on an understanding that states share the responsibility for refugees (Donkoh 2000). The Convention, and the ideas upon which it is based, can in real-life politics be circumvented, criticised and interpreted in a narrow way (Geddes 2003), but it is nevertheless there in the background when policy concerning forced migrants is formulated.

This strictly normative justification for accepting forced migrants is very different from the justification for allowing entry to workers. This, and the fact that the Convention focuses on the needs and the rights of individuals and on the responsibilities of states, opens the way for types of explanatory factors other than the interest-based factors seen as important to labour immigration. Since forced migrants appeal to humanitarian considerations in the receiving states, policymaking in this area is likely to be subject to a different set of political 'constraints' than policymaking in the area of labour immigration (cf. Hollifield 1992: 7–11). It becomes more likely that arguments about solidarity will be seen as relevant, and it increases the probability that policy will be evaluated from perspectives other than the economic one. In other words, it makes it more likely that societal norms of solidarity and humanitarianism will be allowed to influence policymaking, which renders norm-based institutional explanations more relevant.

Note that this is a possibility, not a necessity. The use of the term ‘framing’ is in fact intended to show that how categories are viewed is not fixed, that changes in framing could affect subsequent changes in policy and that changes in framing are likely to affect the relevance of the theoretical argument in this study. For example, scholars have noted a reframing of the asylum issue from a question of international solidarity, or sometimes ‘burden-sharing’, to a question of security, or welfare state abuse (Menz 2009). It is argued that this in turn has led to more punitive responses towards asylum seekers. If the policy frames of ‘security’ and ‘welfare abuse’ are strong enough, they are likely to override other factors in explaining policies towards asylum seekers.

The framing of labour immigration has also gone through changes over recent decades. From having been seen as a problem or sometimes a necessary evil in many countries after the proclaimed end of labour immigration in the 1970s, the economic benefits of labour migration are again highlighted in Western countries (Menz 2009).

That different kinds of immigration often have different framing does not mean that the arguments seen as most valid in one immigration policy area are never used in a differently framed immigration policy area. Normative argumentation can also be used in debates on labour immigration, and economic rationality can also be seen as relevant to policies towards forced migrants. This leads to a more general discussion about the role of domestic institutions in explaining immigration policy. In much of the migration literature, the complexity, the multitude of explanations and the interactions between those explanations are highlighted. Clearly, there will always be a multitude of factors that affect such complex social phenomena as immigration and immigration policy, and the category of ‘immigrants’ contains people with all sorts of characteristics and motivations. These complexities should not be forgotten. Nor should they prevent us from attempting to extract a few of the multiple factors that can have an impact on immigration policy, and to test them empirically, although this inevitably means omitting other relevant explanations.

Immigration policy is a matter of inclusion and exclusion, of defining ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Sales 2007: 3). In shaping immigration policy, there will always be a mixture of factors influencing the balance between exclusion and inclusion: economic interests, human rights considerations, xenophobia, societal norms and values, history, culture and tradition, institutional capacity and international obligations – to name a few. The question then becomes: Why is the leaning between inclusion and exclusion, based on different motives, different in various countries and in different times – and for different kinds of immigration?

The answer that this study provides is that this is not only a question of history, economics or party politics but also a result of how domestic labour

market and welfare state institutions approach the question of inclusion and exclusion, since immigration policy does not stand independent from these central policy areas. States can have inclusive or exclusive labour markets and inclusive and exclusive welfare states. These qualities of institutions can be mirrored in immigration policy, affecting its leaning towards the more inclusive or the more exclusive.

EXPLAINING IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION

As was previously mentioned, the relative openness of countries to immigration depends on the type of immigration being studied, and it is therefore problematic when studies do not differentiate between different sorts of immigration. A related problem is that in comparative studies, *negative* cases have often been neglected, that is, the countries that are not major recipients of immigrants are not included. Naturally this choice of research design makes important variation invisible and will impact upon which factors are seen as important in explaining immigration policy (Bartram 2005). This problem could be mitigated either through a more careful selection of cases when conducting case studies or through exploring larger numbers of cases, including negative ones. In this study, the second strategy is used as far as possible.

As Beine et al. (2016) note, 'For the most part, researchers comparing immigration policies have relied upon qualitative evidence from small N studies that draw on a few countries' (2016: 832). Such case studies are of great importance to our understanding of immigration policy and not least the current study owes a tremendous debt to the insight they offer into particular cases. Nevertheless, despite more recent efforts to study migration using large-N designs (see e.g. Hooghe et al. 2008; Neumayer 2005; Ruhs 2013; Thielemann 2004; Vink and Meijerink 2003), there is still a great need for broader comparisons between countries and – importantly – also over time (Beine et al. 2016). This study answers the call for more large-N studies in the field, and it also aims to offer an analysis that covers a substantial time period. It includes twenty countries and the analysis stretches from 1980 to 2008. This study thus offers a story about how immigration to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries has been shaped during almost three decades. While it has not been possible to address the most recent immigration policy developments in the main analyses, the final chapter discusses recent events in the light of the findings in this study.

The choice to increase the number of cases inevitably comes at a cost. It becomes impossible to take into account all of the contextual information that is relevant in each case, and it is often necessary to use fairly simple measures

of the variables of interest. In this study, data on actual immigration – from OECD, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Labour Organization (ILO), Eurostat and national sources – are used, rather than some measure of relative restrictiveness of immigration legislation. The immigration researchers who have refrained from using these data in statistical analysis have had good reasons for their choice, since the quality of the available immigration data is sometimes problematic. Here, this problem will be approached by using many different kinds of immigration data that can partly compensate for each other's shortcomings.

To use immigration numbers as an indicator of immigration policy also makes it necessary to address the claim that globalisation has diminished the state's control of immigration numbers – the so-called globalisation approach (Castles 1998; Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994). As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, the assumption here is that although we are unlikely to find a state that has perfect control over its borders, states are able to exercise enough control to shape immigration patterns. Moreover, the degree to which countries have control over immigration is actually something that the theoretical framework presented here takes into account, although it is difficult to examine empirically.

The immigration data are used in time series cross-section analysis, where the effects of labour market and welfare state institutions on immigration are estimated under control for a number of economic, historical and party variables. The overall conclusion from these analyses is that these institutions do have the effects that the theoretical framework makes us expect, and that these institutional effects are substantial when compared to most of the alternative explanations, such as political parties or economic variables.

Specific patterns of immigration are, however, only one implication of the theoretical framework. It also gives specific expectations about differences between institutional contexts when it comes to perceptions, attitudes and norms in the area of immigration and is therefore further examined by using public opinion data from (most of) the countries included in the study. The public opinion analysis serves somewhat different purposes for different parts of the study. When it comes to examining the effects of labour market institutions on public opinion, the purpose is not only to see if there is an institutional effect on whether immigrants are perceived as *workers* by the public but also to see if there is an effect of labour market institutions on the degree to which immigration is perceived as a socio-economic threat. As it turns out, effects are found in questions concerning immigrants' positions in the labour market: respondents in liberal labour market contexts are more prone to believe that, to legitimately reside in the country, immigrants should be employed – while at the same time they are more prone to believe that immigrants take jobs from natives.

When it comes to the effect of welfare state institutions, the theoretical argument about the impact of welfare state institutions on forced immigration can only to a limited extent be anchored in the existing theoretical and empirical literature on immigration policy. Therefore, the public opinion analysis for this part of the study serves as an investigation of the suggested causal mechanism. The theoretical framework gives clear expectations about the norms surrounding forced immigration, in the general public and in political life. Generous and inclusive welfare state institutions are expected to induce norms of ‘large-scale solidarity’, to lead to increased levels of generalised trust and to increase the expectations on what the state can and should do. This is expected to lead to more positive attitudes and less suspicion towards forced immigrants – which in the end is expected to lead to more generous policies towards forced immigrants. The public opinion analyses in this part of the study therefore aim to establish whether differences between institutional contexts can be found when it comes to such attitudes, both regarding forced immigration in general and the granting of material rights to forced immigrants. The main results from this part of the study are that, as expected, comprehensive welfare state institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards forced immigrants. Importantly, this effect is found specifically for forced immigration, rather than for immigration in general, which indicates that the ‘framing assumption’ holds: the norms that the welfare state is expected to nurture are valid, in particular, in the case of forced immigration.

To further the analysis of societal norms surrounding forced immigration, two of the countries in the study – Sweden and the United Kingdom – are examined in more detail. Official documents and secondary sources are used to see whether the societal norms detected in the public opinion analysis also make an impact in the political debate. The purpose is to show that norms and values are not just abstract concepts which have no meaning in real-life politics. As it turns out, differences are found between the two countries in how the area of forced immigration has been debated, suggesting that Swedish politicians have been keener to uphold the image of a ‘generous’ country, whereas British politicians have been more prone to highlight the importance of control and rooting out abuse. In thus establishing the fact that norms and values do seem to be present in the political debate, we get one step closer to the conclusion that norms stemming from welfare state institutions in fact have an impact on policymaking in the area of forced immigration.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

In the next chapter, the theoretical framework is developed in more detail. It begins with a brief overview of institutional analysis and proceeds to consider

how labour market institutions could be expected to have an impact on labour immigration. This section makes use of both classical work on immigration and labour markets and more recent studies that focus particularly on the effects of labour market institutions. The theoretical account partly builds upon, and partly departs from, the VoC framework within comparative political economy. Many ideas about institutional impacts on labour market characteristics and labour demand come from this strand of comparative political economy. Yet, rather than focusing on ‘regimes’ that cluster around specific values on a large range of variables, an attempt is made to extract variables where clear expectations can be made regarding their effect on labour immigration. Three factors are highlighted: wage bargaining institutions, the power of unions and active labour market policies. It is suggested that decentralised bargaining, a weak position for unions and government reluctance to invest in active labour market policies are likely to lead to higher levels of labour immigration. It is further suggested that this will be visible not only in numbers of foreign workers but also in labour market outcomes of immigrants as well as the perception of immigration among the general public.

While the argument about the impact of labour market institutions follows quite naturally from previous theoretical and empirical work on labour immigration, the second argument in this study – that encompassing welfare state institutions will lead to more open policies towards forced migrants – has fewer parallels in the existing immigration policy literature. On the contrary, the opposite pattern has often been suggested. This argument is therefore to a lesser extent built on previous work in the immigration policy field and instead builds largely on the comparative welfare state literature. This line of research has been very successful in pointing out that institutions not only influence incentive structures such as costs and rewards for different actions, but that they also have a considerable impact on norms and values, or on what is seen as morally right. It is suggested that there are clear, albeit seldom acknowledged, theoretical parallels between the politics of the welfare state and politics towards forced migrants, and that we should expect that norms following from welfare state experiences can also be transferred to other policy areas – in this case, to immigration policy.

Chapter 3 has three aims: it provides a first assessment of the plausibility of the theoretical argument by using bivariate analysis and contextual information; it serves as a presentation of the data that will be used in subsequent chapters and it examines the assumption that this study builds on – that labour immigration and forced immigration indeed require different explanatory models. The chapter begins with a discussion about the data that are used in the study, including their strengths and weaknesses. Data on immigration as well as labour market and welfare state institutions are presented, together with more qualitative information about immigration policies and practices

in the different countries included. Together, this provides a picture of the countries' relative openness towards labour immigration and forced immigration. By contrasting this with labour market and welfare state data, an initial idea of the patterns emerges. The message from this chapter is that while there are exceptions to the patterns, labour market and welfare state institutions seem to have a great deal to offer in explaining immigration policy. Moreover, it is shown that labour immigration and forced immigration show different patterns and also have different dynamics, which indicates that the basic assumption about the necessity of using different explanatory models for different kinds of immigration is valid. Chapter 3 also includes an initial discussion about how institutional developments in the international arena – or, more specifically, within the EU – impact on immigration and how this must be taken into account. For labour immigration, the discussion concerns the immigration for purposes of work that is taking place under free movement regimes. For forced immigration, the impact of the EU harmonisation efforts in the area of asylum is discussed.

The occurring patterns of labour immigration are further examined in chapter 4. The first part of this chapter contains statistical analyses in which additional variables are included in order to take into account other major explanations of immigration policy. This analysis largely supports the theoretical expectations regarding an institutional effect, but there are also some indications that the effect is weakening over time. The analysis is complemented with an examination of how immigrants and immigration are perceived by the public in different labour market contexts. Moreover, the chapter briefly examines the issue of labour market outcomes for immigrants. These investigations, together with the analysis in chapter 3, point to the conclusion that effects of labour market institutions can be found in the overall degree of 'labour market orientation' of immigration and that the effects are visible not only in numbers of foreign workers but also in labour market outcomes of immigrants and in the public's perceptions of immigrants.

In chapter 5, the connection between welfare state institutions and openness towards forced migrants is examined in greater detail. The main theoretical expectations are again supported by statistical analysis, and again there are some indications that the effect weakens over time. The analysis is followed by an examination of public opinion data, showing that attitudes towards forced migrants do differ between various welfare state contexts in the way that the theoretical framework suggests they should. The following closer inspection of two cases – Sweden and the United Kingdom – strengthens the impression that norms nurtured by comprehensive welfare state institutions can indeed impact upon policy.

Chapter 6 offers a recapitulation of the main results and aims to put them in a wider context. Against the background of the weakened effects of domestic

institutions on immigration, these dynamics, as well as more recent policy developments, are discussed. The chapter ends by suggesting some central considerations that should be made when designing immigration policy institutions so that both policy objectives and policy evaluation are in line with the basic logic of the policy area.

The results in this study constitute an addition to the vast literature that highlights the importance of institutions. They indicate that domestic institutions can have effects well beyond those initially intended, and that experiences from institutions in one policy area can have implications for other policy areas. Furthermore, they show how normative and incentive-building effects of institutions can exist alongside each other – and that they can be in conflict with each other.

NOTES

1. *Immigration policy* – or sometimes immigration control policy or immigration regulation – refers to the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens (Meyers 2000: 1246). This should be distinguished from *immigrant policy*, which refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants (Hammar 1985: 7–10; Meyers 2000: 1246).

2. Experts on migration have pointed out that it is surprisingly difficult to pin down what is actually meant by international migration. The definition of international migration as permanent/semi-permanent movement by people across borders is becoming too narrow as, for example, short-term migration grows in importance (Geddes 2003: 8). In this study, both short-term and long-term international migration – subsequently viewed by the receiving state as immigration – is of interest.

3. An assumption that must be made here is that it is meaningful to discuss different categories of immigration. These categories are not fixed. As Massey et al. (1998) note, ‘Although scholars and officials may conceptualize immigrants as belonging to discrete legal categories or fitting into well-ordered behavioral typologies, what is often overlooked is the fluidity of people across categories and how quickly they adjust their behaviour in response to changes in laws, policies, and circumstances’ (Massey et al. 1998: 287). Moreover, the process of categorisation of immigrants carried out by states is in itself politics (Geddes 2003: 8). What is stated here is that although these categories are not natural, but rather created and recreated, they are still *relevant*.

4. Labour migration is often called ‘economic’ migration, and ‘humanitarian’ migration is a term often used either for forced migration or for forced and family migration combined.

5. *Migrants* become, from the point of view of the receiving country, *immigrants*. To reflect the fact that actions in the receiving countries are in focus, ‘immigrant’ is the term used here, although the term ‘forced immigrant’ is not ideal since it is the initial migration, and not necessarily the specific act of immigration, that is forced.