

Chapter 1

Introduction

Today, states cooperate in hundreds of international intergovernmental organisations and regimes (IOs) in a very wide range of policy areas (Union of International Associations 2005/2006: 2966). A similar observation is in order regarding regional organisations and groups (ROs): there are hardly any parts of the world left in which cooperation between states is not institutionalised on a regional basis. The policies covered in IOs and ROs increasingly overlap (e.g. Börzel 2012, Götz and Haggrén 2008). While regional integration mainly started off as cooperation in the economic realm, ROs became increasingly active beyond their borders in the past decades. In addition, there is a considerable overlap in the membership of states in regional organisations and groups as well as in IOs today. Accordingly, we observe that not only states but also ROs are becoming active in IOs (Panke 2013b). Prominent examples include the League of Arab States' (LAS) request vis-à-vis the Security Council to send a peacekeeping mission into Syria in spring 2012, the Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) role in pushing the membership of Laos in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012 or the European Union's (EU) failed attempt to obtain full member representation rights in the United Nations General Assembly in 2010 and its achievement in attaining enhanced participation rights in 2011. Besides such anecdotal evidence, we do not know much about whether and to which extent regional actor activity has led to a regionalisation of both the dynamics of today's international negotiations and international negotiation outcomes. We also do not know which factors drive such a regionalisation and whether it takes place evenly across policy areas (e.g. economy and trade, environment, security) and IO negotiation arenas. Filling this gap in our knowledge is important, as a regionalisation of international negotiations implies that international negotiations are no longer purely state–state interactions since

regional positions are voiced and that active ROs can leave regional imprints on international norms and rules. Both can have significant implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance beyond the nation-state more generally. Moreover, a regionalisation of today's international negotiations suggests that modifications of states' classical foreign policy approaches are called for, as they need to take into consideration that ROs have turned into essential actors on the international scene.

Despite the timeliness and relevance of the issue and although there is much talk about the regionalisation of world politics and of international relations (e.g. Acharya 2007, Katzenstein 1996, Pentland 1975), as of yet there is no comprehensive comparative study available on the phenomenon of how and to which extent regional actors alter dynamics and outcomes of international negotiations. To shed light on this blind spot, the book addresses the following research questions:

- Are some ROs more active than others and, if so, how can observed patterns be explained?
- Can ROs exert influence over international norms although they are not usually full members of IOs, and, if so, under what conditions are regional actors successful?

In answering these questions, the book provides a systematic analysis of how strongly today's international negotiation dynamics and outcomes are regionalised. More precisely, it describes and explains differences between more than sixty ROs across a high number of IOs regarding regional actor activity (first dependent variable) and regional actor success in international negotiations (second dependent variable).

The book takes stock of today's regionalisation of international negotiations. It shows that ROs are indeed active in a broad variety of different international negotiations either directly through RO delegates or indirectly through member states that negotiate on behalf of their regional group. On average, regional positions are voiced in nearly 12 per cent of the negotiation contributions. Thus, today every twelfth time a position is articulated in a multilateral negotiation on the international level, it is not national but regional in character. Interestingly, some regional actors are more vocal in international negotiations than others, and some IOs are more conducive to RO activity than others. For example, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) voice regional positions about twice as often as members of Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) or the African Union (AU). Likewise, IOs such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD) or the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) are more prone to regional actor participation during negotiations than the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or the International Whaling Commission (IWC), as the former feature a considerably higher share of regional positions voiced (average 20 per cent of all speeches made are regional in character) than the latter (average 2 per cent of regional negotiation contributions). Drawing on multilevel governance approaches and applying mixed methods, the book demonstrates that ROs are most active if group coordination works well and RO members are able and willing to act on behalf of their group. Moreover, IOs feature a stronger regionalisation of negotiations if they are large in size so that states bundle positions into groups rather than individual interests, and if the issues covered in the international negotiations are closely linked to core RO themes.

The book also casts light on the extent to which today's international negotiation outcomes are regionalised. Thus it examines how and under which conditions the activity of ROs in international negotiations can lead to success. It shows that some regional actors are more successful in influencing negotiation dynamics and outcomes than others, most notably CARICOM and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) or the Buenos Aires Group (BAG) in the negotiations on a whale sanctuary in the South Atlantic within the IWC, while others, such as the ASEAN in the IWC negotiations or the GCC and the Organisation of American States (OAS) in the ATT case, are not very effective either in lobbying outside states to support a specific regional position or in directly shaping international norms according to their own regional preferences. Apart from differences in the rate of success between ROs, IOs also differ in the extent to which regional interests translate into changes in international norms. Most open to RO influence are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), while the Security Council (SC) or the UNESCO is least open in this respect. The book uses a multilevel governance approach and applies mixed methods, showing that the observed variation in RO success is best explained by the issue saliency of the international negotiation theme for ROs, internal burden-sharing and their internal homogeneity as well as the variety and effectiveness of negotiation strategies being used.

Studying how ROs act in IOs is important not only because it impacts dynamics and outcomes of international negotiations, but also because the actions of ROs can bring about a regionalisation of international relations. First, RO participation changes the nature of international negotiations by turning the orientation from classical state–state interaction into interactions between regional actors in which often regional instead of national positions

are voiced. Moreover, vocal regional actors reduce the number of different positions at the IO negotiation table, which can speed up and render international negotiations more effective. Second, the regionalisation of international negotiations also affects voting patterns as well as the content of international norms. Individual states lose shaping power, while actors speaking on behalf of a regional organisation, such as the AU or the GCC, or a regional group, such as the United Nations Group of Latin American Countries (GRULAC), gain leverage. Accordingly, in such constellations, international norms tend to reflect the interests of those regional actors that are well organised, able to develop common positions and act in concert in international arenas in which multilateral negotiations take place. Third, this regionalisation has implications for the legitimacy of international negotiation dynamics and outcomes. On the one hand, regional organisations *de facto* exert influence, although they usually lack formal voting rights. On the other hand, even the biggest states, such as the United States, China or Russia, could lose considerable influence on the international level if they act on their own and do not increase their leverage through joining and operating in regional groups or in approaching and negotiating with ROs they are not members of.

1.1 THE ARGUMENT AND MAJOR FINDINGS

Globalisation is by no means a new phenomenon, as cross-border interactions have brought about complex economic, societal and political interdependencies over centuries (Baylis et al. 2011, Keohane 1984, 1989). Yet in the past 100 years changes in transportation technologies and communication have created a new intensity of interactions and interdependencies across borders (Keohane 2001, Krasner 1991). Thus, it does not come as much of a surprise that not only the number of IOs, but also the number of ROs, has increased tremendously since the end of World War II (WWII) (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2014). Today there are hardly any parts of the world in which cooperation between states is not institutionalised on a regional basis. While regional integration mainly started off as cooperation in the economic realm, the external policy component has become increasingly important in the past decades. Accordingly, the policies covered in IOs and ROs increasingly overlap. Simultaneously, states are often members of regional and international organisations. Thus, we observe that not only states but also regional actors are becoming active in international negotiations (Panke 2013b). Prominent examples include the EU in international environmental or trade negotiations. Despite the importance of the issue the literature overwhelmingly focuses on the EU, and no one has yet comparatively studied the role of today's more than sixty ROs in a broad variety of prominent IOs. To shed light on this blind

spot, the book *Regional Actors in Multilateral Negotiations* studies the interplay between states, regional and international organisations. It provides a systematic analysis of how active and how influential ROs are in international negotiations. More precisely, it describes and explains differences between regional actors and across international negotiation arenas in regard to RO activity (DV1) and RO success (DV2).

The book examines the following research questions:

- Are some regional actors more vocal in international negotiations than others, and, if so, how can the observed variation be explained?
- The book also examines under which conditions RO activity translates into influence over international negotiation dynamics and outcomes and asks: Are some regional actors more successful than others in international negotiations, and, if so, why?

In answering these research questions, we fill gaps in several strands of state-of-the-art research on the external actorhood of regional organisations, comparative regionalism and international cooperation (c.f. below).

In order to answer these questions, the book adopts an explanatory research design. It is theory-guided, methodologically stringent and empirical in character. Theoretically, it develops an extended multilevel governance approach and develops hypotheses on RO activity (DV1) and RO success (DV2). These hypotheses are empirically tested on the basis of mixed methods. In a first step, we use quantitative methods in order to explain variation in RO activity across institutional contexts and policy areas. In a second step, we adopt qualitative methods in order to account for varying success of ROs in influencing international negotiation outcomes.

1.1.1 Theory: Expanded multilevel governance systems

Multilevel governance approaches (MLG) analytically account for the dispersion of decision-making authority across multiple layers of government (Hooghe and Marks 2001). They capture how policies are formulated and implemented on the basis of cross-level coordination, which often takes place via negotiations between actors from different levels of a multilevel system (c.f. Benz 2007, Börzel 2010, Scharpf 1997b, Zürn 2012). Prominent examples of MLG systems are federal states or regional organisations such as the EU. The political systems traditionally studied using MLG approaches are two-tier systems, which are typically comprised of either the state and federal levels, or the state and regional levels. Apart from the two-level MLG systems, there are also three-level systems comprised of, for example, a state, a regional and an international level. Such systems constitute extended multilevel governance

systems (EMLGs) if there is some sort of power delegation from the state or regional to the international level and if there is some sort of division of labour between the levels (Zürn 2012). In EMLG systems, three layers of governance are of importance, namely the state level, the regional level and the international level (c.f. chapter 2). The state level is crucial for the development and adjustment of national positions in relation to draft international norms that have been put on the IO's negotiation agenda (domestic position formation). Based on national positions, states that are also members of a regional organisation or regional group can engage in coordinating common regional positions (RO-level negotiations) or directly participate in IO negotiations, voicing national positions. In cases where member states of regional organisations or regional groups have developed a common regional position, they or the representative of a regional organisation or regional group can act on behalf of the RO in international negotiations (IO-level negotiations). This might increase the leverage of RO members and might translate into more influence over the content of international norms.

The three-level negotiation framework captures the process of position formation and adjustment between regional actor member states, which is central to RO activity in international negotiations and crucial for the prospects of regional actors to successfully changing international negotiation dynamics and outcomes.

Since not all regional groups and organisations have speaking rights in all IOs, RO activity is not confined to RO representatives voicing a regional position during multilateral negotiations on the international level. In instances where regional actors have no formal roles in IOs, the member states of regional groups and organisations can (and often do; see chapter 3) speak on behalf of their respective group and voice regional positions instead of national ones. Accordingly, the hypotheses related to the member state level capture how state capacities and incentives influence whether they effectively coordinate a common regional group position with the other RO members so that they can speak on behalf of their regional organisation or group in international negotiations and possibly also influence negotiation dynamics and outcomes.

Usually, MLG approaches assume that states as actors know their position before negotiating with other states (c.f. König et al. 2012, Moravcsik 1993). Yet, this is not automatically the case for ROs in international negotiations (Panke 2013c). In order to be active in IOs, it is essential that RO members have a coordinated joint regional position in the first place. Accordingly, on the regional level, a set of hypotheses focus on how an RO's institutional rules and capacities influence its members' chances of developing common regional positions in relation to the items on the IO agenda, which is a precondition for being active and successful in international negotiations.

Institutional rules regulate who has access to negotiation arenas and how the decision-making competencies are distributed. This is essential for both negotiation dynamics and outcomes (Grande 2000, König et al. 2010, Scharpf 1988, Tsebelis 2002, Tsebelis and Garrett 1997). Accordingly, on the level of IOs, the hypotheses explicate how the formal rules influence ROs' prospects of directly (delegates of regional organisations or regional groups) or indirectly (member states on behalf of their ROs) voicing regional positions in IO negotiations and how and under what conditions this affects the prospects for regional actor success.

1.1.2 Mapping and analysis of RO negotiation activity (DV1)

In a first empirical step, the book presents insights into the patterns of negotiation activity of states and ROs in a sample of 512 international negotiations, in a broad range of policy areas (e.g. economy and trade, labour and social policies, environment, security and disarmament, human rights). To get a balanced sample of international negotiations we covered a broad spectrum of policy areas and systematically vary IO membership size and IO openness to ROs (no formal status, formal observer status, formal voting rights). Thus, we ended up with a sample of twenty-seven international organisations. On this basis, we selected 4 negotiations per year and per IO in a time period beginning in 2008 and ending in 2012, covering a total of 512 negotiations (c.f. chapter 3, annex table A3.1). The database is comprehensive. It entails not only 203 states and state-like actors (e.g. Taiwan, Holy See), but also all of today's more than sixty regional organisations as well as all other regional groups and coalitions (e.g. the UN's African Group [UNAG] or the BAG) that were active in at least 1 of the 512 negotiations studied in the book. On average, every 11.94th position voiced in international negotiations is regional in character.

There is interesting variation in regional actor activity. For instance, regional positions are twelve times more frequently articulated in the ILO (23.88 per cent of all statements) than in the UNESCO (1.96 per cent). Moreover, not all ROs are equally active. The respective members voiced positions of their regional groups to different extents. For example, of all statements made by EU member states, 33.43 per cent were made on behalf of the EU, while GCC members spoke for their RO 26.38 per cent of the time and members of the UNAG spoke for 19.81 per cent of possible opportunities. Moreover, the inclination of states to speak on behalf of their regional group or organisation varies as well. Some states exclusively express national interests, such as Rwanda, the Fijis or Armenia, while others articulate regional positions much more frequently, such as Denmark (61.62 per cent), Uganda (56.48 per cent) or Zimbabwe (32.82 per cent). These patterns are puzzling,

not in the least since all states benefit from leveraging up in international negotiations through referring to collective positions, yet the extent to which they do so varies considerably. The variation of RO activity between IOs is counterintuitive as well, as it is not the case that IOs in which ROs can obtain voting rights (e.g. WTO, ITTO or UNFCCC) feature systematically the strongest regionalisation of negotiations.

Which ROs are most active in multilateral negotiations and why? In which IOs do we observe the strongest RO activity and why? In order to account for the observed variation and comprehensively examine the EMLG hypotheses, the book combines multilevel regression analysis with narrative evidence from more than 240 semi-structured interviews with national diplomats and RO members. This reveals that the extent to which international negotiations are regionalised varies, which can be explained by a combination of member state-, regional- and international-level variables.

With respect to the national level, the book argues that national positions vis-à-vis a draft international rule or norm or draft rule on the IO agenda do not naturally exist, but need to be formulated in the domestic realm and subsequently passed on to the national diplomat responsible for negotiating in the IO. The more administrative capacities states possess, the swifter the development of national positions for a broad range of issues on the IO negotiation agenda and the more actively the national diplomats can participate in RO coordination meetings and IO negotiations. Vice versa, states with capacity shortages are less likely to actively participate in group coordination meetings and in international negotiations. The book also shows that the extent to which a state's political culture is democratic has a positive effect on the chances of RO members to compromise on regional positions during RO coordination meetings, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for ROs to become active on the IO level.

With respect to the regional level, the book shows that RO institutional rules, such as membership rules, matter. The number of RO member states can increase the activity level of regional actors in international negotiations. The larger a regional actor is, the greater the chances are that at least one of them articulates the regional position. Also, the broader the scope of policy competencies of an RO, the more often past RO policies can serve as focal points rendering regional coordination and the construction of a common negotiation position easier. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that regional positions are voiced in international negotiations. Another RO-level property that affects RO member states' chances of successfully developing a common regional position that can subsequently be voiced on the IO level is the level of capacity devoted to facilitating state-state coordination meetings at the location of IO negotiations. ROs with many offices at the locations of IO headquarters are better able to develop and update common positions among

their member states, which increases the prospects of RO activity in international negotiations.

The international level also accounts for variation in the extent to which international negotiations are regionalised. The size of IOs has important implications for how negotiations are conducted in practice. With a large membership of fifty or even more member states, negotiations would be extremely time-consuming if each member state voiced its national position and participated actively during the course of deliberations in IO institutions. Instead of making a *tour de table*, states aggregate national positions in groups and voice national positions only if they deviate or are incompatible with an RO position or in instances where RO members have not developed a regional position at all. Thus, larger IOs are more conducive to the regionalisation of international negotiations. In addition, the book illustrates that ROs are more active in IOs, when the latter grants them formal access to the negotiations.

State, regional and international levels are interlinked, which places state actors in a position where they could engage in forum-shopping and choose the level where they would like to deal with a specific item (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Kellow 2012). In nested negotiations within EMLG systems, states that are members of both the IO and ROs can choose between acting on their own or working through an RO for each item under negotiation in IOs. Accordingly, incentive structures of states matter for the prevalence of regional positions in IOs. For instance, states are more motivated to act on behalf of a specific RO and voice regional instead of national positions, when they serve as chairmen for this RO. Moreover, if an RO has a formal status in an IO, it is more vocal in this specific arena.

1.1.3 Analysis of RO negotiation success (DV2)

Which regional actors are most successful and why? The book illustrates that ROs vary in their ability to leave regional imprints on international norms. ROs are most successful in shaping international negotiation dynamics and the content of international negotiation outcomes according to how well their internal coordination works, how actively they participate in the negotiations on the basis of common regional positions and how effectively negotiation strategies are used on the basis of combined leverage and expertise of the RO member states. In addition, regional actors are more successful the more RO member states refrain from voicing deviating individual positions. Accordingly, regional actors are most influential if they do not only actively voice their positions, but also if their members possess economic leverage, vote-based leverage or expertise. The success of regional actors also varies across international negotiation contexts. According to our theoretical framework,

IOs should be most prone to regional actor success the more member states IOs have, and the more encompassing the formal rights that regional actors can obtain are in an IO.

We examine three qualitative case studies on the basis of the EMLG hypotheses about negotiation success and follow a structure-focused comparison design in order to select the negotiation arenas. Accordingly, the case selection systematically varies with respect to two core variables on the IO level (strength of formal RO status in IO and IO size), whilst keeping important alternative explanations constant across the cases (e.g. concerning RO and member state properties). A least likely instance for RO success is the IWC, as it is not very large in size and does not grant many ROs strong formal status. By contrast, the FAO is a negotiation arena in which RO success is most likely. It has many members and, regional actors have formal roles, and ROs can even apply for full membership. In between the ATT case, as this negotiation arena is large in size, while the formal roles of ROs are limited to observers. In each of the three contexts, one recent negotiation on an international norm was selected. The case studies use primary document analysis as well as more than 200 semi-structured interviews with RO members, state diplomats and representatives of IOs as well as civil society actors in order to trace the processes of how and under what conditions regional actor activity translates into the successful shaping of international negotiation dynamics and outcomes.

The negotiations on the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary (SAWS) that took place in the IWC are a least likely case for RO success. The IWC is an IO made up of eighty-eight member states and responsible for the conservation of whales and the management of whaling. ROs may gain observer status and thereby ‘will have speaking rights during Plenary sessions and sessions of Commission subsidiary groups and Committees to which they are admitted to’ (International Whaling Commission 2014c, Art. C.3), but so far only the EU is a registered observer. The IWC’s main task is to review and revise the measures laid down in the Convention’s Schedule, which governs the conduct of whaling. Measures are, for example, the creation of a sanctuary, and set limits on the numbers and size of whales which may be hunted. The case study examines the 2011, 2012 and 2014 negotiations on the creation of a whale sanctuary in the South Atlantic Ocean, in which commercial whaling is prohibited. There were two important regional actors in the IWC negotiations, the EU and the BAG, a regional coalition founded by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and Panama. In both cases, the member states engaged in coordination meetings in order to develop common positions that were then presented as group positions rather than an individual state’s preference in the IWC negotiation arena. While the BAG was strongly united, the internal homogeneity of the EU was more limited due to the often deviating

position of Denmark, which was sympathetic to whaling due to the fact that it represents Greenland in the IWC. As a consequence, the BAG negotiated with full energy and was actively driving the international negotiations, while the EU operated on the basis of its minimal agreed position and applied only a limited array of negotiation strategies. Other ROs, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), MERCOSUR or South African Development Community (SADC), were not active in the SAWS negotiations as their members did not coordinate to develop a common position. The case study illustrates that regional group activity is an essential prerequisite for RO success, but by no means in itself sufficient. Most important, ROs are successful in changing negotiation dynamics if they manage to talk third-party states into supporting their own position. To this end, the BAG and, to a more limited extent, also the EU engaged in lobbying and persuasion-based strategies on the basis of their respective regional positions. In order to be substantively successful and leave a regional imprint on an international negotiation outcome, regional actors must be able to alter norms in line with their own positions or prevent deviating changes. The BAG was the main driving force behind the SAWS proposal and had managed to change the language of the SAWS proposal in line with its preferences in 2011, 2012 and 2014. In 2011 and 2012, the BAG explicated that the SAWS area would not include national waters (Brazil being the only exception), and in 2014 the BAG strengthened the SAWS proposal substantively, as it strove to forbid no longer commercial whaling only, but all forms of whaling (including for scientific purposes) within the SAWS area. The EU had no interest in proposing text changes of their own or including additional elements, but agreed with the BAG on all points. Although the EU and especially the BAG were active, the SAWS norm was not passed in the 2012 and 2014 voting, respectively, since the required threshold of supporters was not reached. Thus, neither regional group was ultimately substantively successful. In short, the SAWS negotiations in the IWC constitute a least likely case for the regionalisation of international negotiations. Nevertheless, even in this arena international negotiations are regionalised to some extent, as there is RO activity and as ROs are able to successfully alter negotiation dynamics and the norm proposals, but failed to ultimately get them passed.

Compared to the SAWS case, regional actors were more active and also more successful in the ATT case. The negotiations started and ended in the UNGA and were held in the negotiation regime consisting of four Preparatory Committees and two Conferences of the Parties in between. The negotiation arenas are characterised by a high number of member states (193), while ROs can only be registered as observers. The ATT is part of the global efforts to reduce the illicit arms trade and as it establishes common standards for the international trade of conventional weapons. In the negotiations of an ATT, which lasted from 2010 to 2013, the CARICOM and ECOWAS, followed by

the EU, were the most vocal regional actors. The members of African ROs, most notably ECOWAS and CARICOM, placed great emphasis on regulating the (illicit) trade of small arms and light weapons and redirected their administrative and political resources towards group coordination. This was effective and led to the formulation of regional positions that the respective RO member states articulated and pushed during the ATT negotiations in the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and during the Conference of the Parties (CoP) itself. Other ROs which were hardly active, such as Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) or SCO, had internal problems of coordination, not in the least due to the heterogeneity of member state interests combined with limited issue saliency. These hindrances resulted in the failure to swiftly develop and update common regional positions that could have been articulated during the ongoing international negotiations. Not every regional position voiced in the more than three years of negotiations was effectively influential on negotiation dynamics and outcomes. For example, the EU was not very successful with respect to the status of ROs in the ATT as signatories or with respect to the question of whether the ATT should also cover re-export, technical assistance, leases, gifts and loans related to conventional weapons, which was in part due to the fact that the EU member states could not agree on what the best approach would be. Other ROs were more successful. For instance, CARICOM was one of the strongest supporters for the inclusion of ammunition in the Treaty. They achieved the mentioning of bullets and other forms of ammunition in the Treaty by extensively using a broad array of argumentative and lobbying strategies. These strategies worked due to the expertise that backed up the arguments and the resources the regional actor invested in bilateral lobbying in New York as well as in various capitals. The fact that ECOWAS sided with CARICOM and also started to lobby for the inclusion of ammunition further helped to get the point across. Other instances in which ROs were successful include CARICOM's and PIF's negotiation efforts to promote capacity-sensitive solutions for states affected by transit or transshipment. Taken together, the ATT negotiations were highly regionalised, and regional actors induced significant changes in the negotiation outcome, although none of the ROs had formal voting rights.

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is a most likely arena for RO success. It comprises 194 member states and ROs can apply for full membership or can register as observers. Apart from the EU as a member organisation with speaking and voting rights, the FAO has between ten and sixteen regional group observers, the activity of which are varying over FAO committees and over time. In general, observers can speak up if invited by the Chairperson. The FAO's major task relates to agricultural and food-related issues, and the negotiations under scrutiny in the case study focus on the 'Rome Declaration on Nutrition' of 2014. The 2014 Rome Declaration

seeks to fight malnutrition, foster food security and increase international cooperation to these ends. Between March and November 2014 representatives from more than 170 countries, as well as representatives of civil society organisations and the private sector, participated in the working groups and the subsequent second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in the FAO Headquarter in Rome. The negotiations were conducted under FAO rules and express a joint effort of the FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO). In November 2014 the member states adopted the Rome Declaration on Nutrition by acclamation. With this declaration the member states obliged themselves to work towards eradicating hunger, preventing all forms of malnutrition worldwide as well as enhancing sustainable food systems. The case study examines the negotiations leading to the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and sheds light on which ROs were active and whether and how regional group activity translated into success. This reveals that especially the EU, the North America group (NOAM), GRULAC and African regional groups have been active throughout the negotiations, and often opposed one another. One of the conflicts focused on trade issues. On the one end of the spectrum, the GRULAC and the African group both placed a strong emphasis on mentioning the negative effects of trade distorting measures (e.g. subsidies), which was opposed by the EU. The former actors could not talk enough states into supporting their position, while the EU succeeded with its preference. Another point of discussion was the ‘decade of nutrition’. GRULAC, with the support of the AFRICA group, pushed for a ‘decade of nutrition’, which the EU opposed as it wanted to avoid additional budgetary expenses. After extensive negotiation efforts, the actors compromised in agreeing to promote the decade of action on nutrition within existing structures and available resources. Hence, although the EU is a highly successful regional actor overall, it needed to compromise on a series of questions as well.

Thus the qualitative part of the book illustrates that the regional actor success first requires that their member states swiftly develop national positions on the basis of which their diplomats can engage in group coordination meetings. Only when the member states are united and formulate a common regional position, an RO member state or an RO delegate can voice it in international negotiations. The more strongly the regional position reflects a minimal compromise, the less motivated are RO members to invest their own resources into using a broad array of negotiation strategies on behalf of the group in international negotiations and the more limited the persuasive and bargaining force of the regional actor vis-à-vis third-party states. In addition, a large size of IOs, as well as formal access opportunities of ROs in IOs, are conducive to the chances that regional positions are successfully articulated in international negotiations. Yet, formal structures alone are not sufficient for RO success. Regional actors need to adopt negotiation strategies for

which they possess the associated resources in order to have a chance in talking others into supporting the regional position. For example, argumentative persuasion-based strategies do not work without a high level of technical, scientific and legal expertise, with which ROs are equipped to varying extents. Lobbying strategies are not effective if ROs lack personnel resources to approach third-party states in various venues and through multiple channels, which provides richer and larger ROs with an advantage. Bargaining-based strategies require bargaining-leverage, such as being pivotal on the basis of votes, which allows for a series of tied-hand strategies by ROs, or economic power to offer side-payments or package deals to pull third-party states to one's side. All these strategies work better the more they are fine-tuned to the issue at the international negotiation table. Accordingly, ROs that meet frequently during ongoing negotiations in order to update and adjust regional positions and negotiation strategies are in a much better position to negotiate successfully in IOs, which is easier to achieve for ROs with high levels of capacities. Hence, ROs that place great emphasis on an international norm and at the same time able to turn into norm-entrepreneurs have good chances to leave regional imprints on international norms.

1.1.4 Core findings

In sum, the book shows that today's international negotiations are regionalised to a considerable extent, as more than one in ten speeches express regional interests. However, the phenomenon of the regionalisation of international politics is nuanced and not equally prevalent across all contexts and actors. It is not the case that ROs are equally active throughout each and every international institution. Large IOs attract more RO activity than smaller ones, especially if many ROs devote capacities to negotiations and if they have a large membership which is able and willing to express regional positions. This reveals that the extent of regionalisation of negotiation dynamics varies on the international level over negotiation arenas for several reasons. IOs that attract the most RO activity are large in membership size because states have greater incentives to aggregate their positions into regional ones and articulate them in order to speed up multilateral negotiations. Also, compared to IOs in which regional actors have no formal status at all, in IOs where a high number of ROs enjoy observer status, the chances increase that these actors become vocal. However, policy match can compensate for lacking formal access; whenever international negotiations touch on issues of high importance for a regional actor, the chances increase that member states voice regional positions so that we observe regionalised international negotiations.

On the regional level, the book shows that the larger an RO is and the more resources it devotes to the development of regional positions for the

multilateral negotiations in IOs, the greater the probability for a regionalisation of international negotiations dynamics. Having a high number of member states increases the chances that at least one of the states will articulate a regional position. In addition, the more often an RO has offices at IO headquarter locations, and the better the regional actor is equipped, the more professionalised the negotiation approach of a regional actor is. The book further evidences that although the United Nations regional groups were not founded to coordinate voting behaviour in the first place but for administrative and procedural purposes within the UN system, by now their negotiation activity is also visible even in IOs not affiliated with the UN.

On the member state level, the observation that some states are more vocal for their ROs than others is due to administrative capacity differences between states and differences in their political culture, which ultimately influences their incentives to speak up on behalf of an RO. States that can swiftly develop national positions for a broad range of issues on the IO agenda can more actively participate in RO coordination meetings and are subsequently better able to become active in the IO and articulate the regional position. Diplomats familiar with the democratic culture of working in context with multiple points of view are oriented towards compromising and are therefore more inclined to support a regional position and speak up on behalf of ROs. Moreover, the book demonstrates that especially middle-sized states use their ROs to leverage up in international negotiations, while larger states can afford to negotiate on their own and while the smallest states would benefit from leveraging up through ROs in IOs, but lack the capacities to do so.

Activity and success are interlinked, and the extent to which international negotiation outcomes are regionalised varies as well. For regional actors to be successful in influencing dynamics and outcomes of international negotiations, it is essential that their respective member states swiftly develop national positions on the basis of which their diplomats can engage in group coordination meetings, most often taking place in the city of the IO headquarters. Only when the RO manages to formulate a regional position, it can be articulated in the IO by its members or, if the RO itself has speaking rights, by RO delegates directly. Since RO member states can negotiate on behalf of their regional group irrespective of the formal status of the regional actor in the IO, the formal access of ROs to IOs is not a necessary precondition for regional actorship in international negotiations. Activity is important for success, but active ROs are not automatically successful. Regional actors are most successful in shaping international negotiation dynamics and also the content of international norms in international negotiations the more effective the strategies used. Argumentative strategies are most effective if regional actors and their member states can rely on a high level of technical, scientific and legal expertise in regard to the issue on the negotiation table. Informal

lobbying strategies work best if the regional actors do not experience shortages in resources to approach third-party states in various venues and through multiple channels. Bargaining strategies, such as no-vote threats, require bargaining leverage in order to be effective. To this end, RO members need to be strongly united and not send mixed messages in international negotiations, and they need to be pivotal on the basis of the distribution of votes in the IO.

Thus, the regionalisation of international negotiation dynamics and outcomes is a widespread and prevalent phenomenon in today's international relations. Regional actors leave imprints on international norms and rules and do so irrespective of their formal role in an IO. While the institutional design of IOs is important, it does not determine the prospects of regional actor success, as regional- and state-level factors are also of high importance for both the ability of regional actors to develop and voice regional positions in international negotiations and the ability of regional actors to negotiate effectively.

1.2 THE STATE OF THE ART AND GAPS

The book makes distinctive contributions to four strands of research, namely international relations, the EU as external actor, comparative regionalism and multilevel governance.

1.2.1 Contributions to international relations

In addition to tackling questions of war and peace (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979), international relations (IR) research of the past also focused on cooperation and discord (Axelrod 1984, Keohane 1984, Keohane and Nye 1989). Today, the focus is not so much on whether there can be cooperation under anarchy (Axelrod and Keohane 1986, Oye 1986), but rather on institutional arenas for cooperation as well as the dynamics and outcomes of multilateral negotiations (Crump and Zartman 2003, Kremenjuk 1991, Plantey 2007). Not in the least because international negotiations are central for cooperation beyond the nation-state, the study of the former is often state-centric in character, examining the role of state power (Berton et al. 1999, Druckman 1997, Habeeb 1988, Powell 1999, Zartman and Rubin 2009), size (Drahos 2003, Panke 2010, 2012e), state capacities (Panke 2013c) or the choice of strategies (Dür and Mateo 2010, Habeeb 1988, Pruitt 1991) for their ability to exert influence and shape the nature and content of international norms. In addition to states as actors, scholars also study the role of NGOs or transnational actors in international negotiations (Martens 2007, Peterson 1992, Risse 2001, Tallberg et al. 2013, Weiss and Gordenker 1996), examining their

access, activities and impact. Thus, the state-centric approach that dominated the discipline of IR has been supplemented by examining the role of different non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational companies, lobby groups and organised interests in international affairs. Despite the spread of regional integration after WWII, the role of ROs in international negotiations has not yet been systematically studied. This is surprising, as ROs have observer status in many other IOs, such as ASEAN, AU, CARICOM, ECOWAS, EFTA or SADC in the ILO, and are even full members in some (e.g. the EU in the WTO or the FAO). Even if an RO has no formal status in an IO at all (e.g. Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010, Gehring et al. 2013), states that are members of both an RO and an IO can voice regional positions on behalf of the regional group or organisation (Panke 2013c). To shed light on this aspect of the regionalisation of international relations, this book systematically explores regional actors in IOs. How do they engage in international, multi-lateral negotiations, and how and under what conditions are ROs successful in influencing negotiation dynamics or in shaping the content of international norms as negotiation outcomes?

1.2.2 Contributions to research on the EU as external actor

The most prominent example of regional integration is the European Union (EU), which is the most integrated RO with the broadest scope (Börzel 2006). Regional integration research started off as a study of the processes and scope of conditions for regional integration to emerge and prosper (Haas 1970, Nye 1968, Schmitter 1970). The second wave of academic engagement examined the politics, policies and polity of various regional organisations, focusing on the impact of regional integration on its members and vice versa (Cowles et al. 2001, Featherstone and Radaelli 2003, Goetz and Hix 2000). In the third wave, researchers started to situate regional integration within the global context, analysing how regional groups and organisations are influenced by international developments as well as international and transnational actors (Amin and Thrift 1994, Verdier and Breen 2001). Less research has been done, however, on the role of the various regional organisations as players in global governance. There is one prominent exception, namely the study of the EU as an external actor, which illustrates that ROs are not necessarily passive on the international level. For example, scholarship highlights how actively the EU engages with states in its vicinity, either through pre-accession conditionality (Böhmelt and Freyburg 2013, Grabbe 2006, Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) or its neighbourhood policy (Freyburg et al. 2009, Kelley 2006, Lavenex 2008, Smith 2005). Over time the toolkit has been broadened, but it is still contested whether the EU has become more effective as a result (Bosse and Korosteleva-Polglase 2009, Lavenex

and Schimmelfennig 2011). In addition, there are studies on how the EU seeks to export its model of governance, its core values and its liberal market approach beyond its borders (Börzel and Hackenesch 2013, Börzel and Risse 2012a, Damro 2012, Farrell 2009, Hettne and Soderbaum 2005, Jetschke and Murray 2012, Lenz 2012, Sedelmeier 2012). Other works examine the external activities of the EU in a broader context, assessing how the EU shapes the outcomes of individual multilateral negotiations to varying extents (e.g. Barocelli 2011, Dee 2015, Delreux 2009b, 2011, Oberthür 1999, Smith 2006, Tsoukalis 2011, Zimmermann 2007) or how it acts in a range of different IOs (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011a, Delreux et al. 2012, Græger and Gavgvik 2011, Joergensen et al. 2011, Smith 2006, 2010, Smith 2013a, b). The finding that these studies have in common is that homogeneity among the EU member states' preferences is essential for the ability of the EU to speak with one voice in international negotiations (e.g. Dee 2012, Joergensen et al. 2011, Kissack 2011, Oberthür 2011, Shahin 2011, Simmons and DiSilvestro 2014, Smith 2013a). Yet, there is dissent on whether internal coherency is a necessary or sufficient condition for the EU's prospects to become influential in IOs (e.g. Gehring 2013, Groenleer and Schaik 2007, Panke 2013b, 2014b, Smith 2006, 2010, van Schaik and Schunz 2012, Wunderlich 2012, Xiarchogiannopoulou and Tsarouhas 2014). This difference in assessment of the coherency variable is not too surprising, as these studies are difficult to compare and do not add up to a precise picture of the influence of the EU. Some of them focus on goal achievements of the EU in different IOs in general, while others examine the negotiation of individual norms (e.g. Delreux 2012, Hivonnet 2012). In addition, the definition and measurement of performance, effectiveness or influence as prominent key concepts in the literature vary, and studies focus too often on different aspects. Moreover, there are no studies that systematically gather data on the activities of a broad range of different regional actors in different IOs, cover a wide range of policy areas, and systematically explain observed variation. This book closes these gaps. It examines the activity and success of ROs from all parts of the world in the most prominent IOs across different policy areas (security, economy/trade/finance, environment, human rights, labour/social and education/health). It puts the EU as an external actor into a comparative context and provides insights into questions such as: Is the EU an actor *sui generis* that is more vocal and engaged in negotiations than all other ROs, such as in the negotiations that take place in the UNGA, the FAO or the WTO? Compared to the EU, how active are other ROs?

1.2.3 Contributions to comparative regionalism

The book also contributes to comparative regionalism research, which has evolved over the past decades. Students of regional integration and regional

cooperation have very often focused their attention on Europe, more specifically on the European Communities, and later on the European Union. Over time, this led to an EU bias in regard to theoretical and empirical insights gathered in regard to dynamics and outcomes of regional integration, which has been criticised by new regionalism approaches (Baccini and Dür 2011, Bowles 1997, Breslin and Higgott 2003, Chandra 2004, Gómez-Mera 2008, Keating 1998, MacLeod 2001, Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010, Söderbaum and Shaw 2003, Telò 2001, Warleigh and Rosamond 2010). This strand of research has increased the general scholarly awareness that cooperation in ROs is not confined to Europe but takes place all over the globe (Börzel and Risse 2016, Fawcett 2004, Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). In fact, today there are more than sixty ROs all over the globe (Panke and Stapel 2016). Comparative regionalism studies different regional actors in relation to one another and seeks to compare the dynamics and outcomes of various regional integration projects (e.g. Basu 2012, Kissack 2010). Scholars also started to analyse how ROs interact with one another, for example how policy ideas or institutional blueprints are diffused or ‘travel’ from one RO to another one (Börzel and Risse 2012a, b, Jetschke and Murray 2012, Lenz 2012, Sanchez Bajo 1999). Students of comparative regionalism have also turned towards studying the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism. Overlapping regionalism emerges if states become members of more than one RO, thereby creating overlaps between ROs not only in regard to membership but often also in regard to policy mandates. Despite the comparative turn in regionalism studies which led to studies on the evolution of regional integration in different geographical parts of the globe, the analysis of various integration outcomes and the examination of interactions between ROs, we still know very little about how the different ROs from all over the globe engage in international relations. More specifically, questions such as which ROs are most active in international negotiations, under which conditions ROs turn their attention to international arenas and participate in governance beyond their territorial borders, and why some ROs are more vocal in IOs than others have not yet been explored. Which state-, regional- and international-level features are conducive to RO activity in international negotiations? Which ROs are most likely to turn activity into success and shape outcomes of international negotiations? This book puts all of today’s ROs into a comparative perspective and studies the regionalisation of international negotiation dynamics and outcomes, thus making a novel contribution to comparative regionalism research.

1.2.4 Contributions to multilevel governance research

Multilevel governance approaches mainly focus on federal states or regional organisations, most prominently the EU, but the approach has not yet been used to study the activity and influence of ROs in international negotiations

within IOs. At their core, MLG approaches analytically capture the fact that decision-making authority is dispersed across multiple layers of government in many political systems (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Accordingly, they capture how policies are formulated on the basis of cross-level coordination, which often takes place via negotiations between actors from different levels of a multilevel system (c.f. Benz 2007, Börzel 2010, Scharpf 1997b). The nested negotiations examined in this book are instances of MLG in which the three layers of governance – the state level, the regional level and the international level – are of importance. Accordingly, in order to capture the dynamics and outcomes of nested negotiations, the book draws on and adds to multilevel governance approaches. It theorises how state, regional, international and policy properties influence the prospects of ROs to participate actively in IO negotiations (DV1) as well as the chances that ROs are successful in these negotiations (DV2). The nested negotiations framework builds on the neo-institutionalist insight that institutions structure but do not determine actor-behaviour (e.g. March and Olsen 1984, Peters 1999, Scharpf 1997a). Moreover, it is based on a broader conception of strategic rationality than orthodox rational-choice approaches since it assumes that actors are strategic and rational in character but have identities and follow norms that are embedded in institutions as well (Scharpf 2000). Based on this micro-foundation, the theoretical model specifies hypotheses on the role of IO properties, RO properties, member state properties and policy characteristics on the participation of ROs (RO activity, DV1) and on the prospects of regional actors to influence negotiation dynamics and outcomes (RO success, DV2). In doing so, the book provides an expanded multilevel governance approach, which captures the linkages between the state, the regional and the international levels.

1.3 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Do regional actors vary in their international negotiation activity and how can variation be explained? Under what conditions does RO activity translate into success in international negotiations? These two research questions are systematically addressed in eight chapters. Taken together, the book provides important and novel insights into the extent to which international negotiations are currently regionalised. It also sheds light on whether the regionalisation is spread evenly across IOs as well as policy areas, or whether there are certain IOs in which the regionalisation of international negotiation dynamics and outcomes is particularly well advanced. On this basis, it provides insights into the driving forces and ends with a reflection on the implications

of today's regionalisation for the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance beyond the nation-state more generally.

Chapter 1 provides an introduction. Although the number of IOs and ROs has risen since the end of WWII and state membership, as well as policy scopes of ROs and IOs, increasingly overlap little is known about the effects of this development. The first chapter argues that it is important to close the research gap in regard to the active and effective participation of regional actors in international negotiations, as such participation brings about a regionalisation of international negotiations. This in turn not only alters the dynamics of international negotiations but also has important implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance beyond the nation-state.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework. Drawing on multilevel governance, liberal theory and negotiation literature, the book develops an EMLG approach which accommodates the interconnectedness between three levels. It theorises how and under what conditions member-state-, regional- and international-level variables as well as policy field-specific characteristics impact RO activity and success in IO negotiations.

Chapter 3 presents empirical insights into regional actor activity in international negotiations. It maps the extent to which today's international negotiations are already regionalised and sheds light on important empirical puzzles. At the state level, it is striking that the propensity to which states negotiate on behalf of a regional group or organisation varies tremendously. Since all states might be able to leverage up in international negotiations if they refer to an RO instead of framing a position as a purely national one, it begs explanation why not all states make use of their regional affiliations. On the regional level, there is considerable variation as well, as regional actors differ in their vocality. For example, the GCC or ASEAN are more active than the Arab League or the SCO, although the pairs are relatively similar with regard to institutional set-up. On the international level, IOs vary in the extent to which they attract the articulation of regional voices. In this respect it is, for example, puzzling that the WTO, which covers a policy area which is also covered by many ROs and is formally open to ROs as observers and potentially also members (as the EU case illustrates), has less strongly regionalised negotiations than UNCTAD or the ILO, both of which delimit the formal roles of ROs much more and feature a less pronounced policy field match with respect to ROs.

Chapter 4 empirically examines the theoretical expectations concerning regional actor activity. Due to the semi-hierarchical structure of the data advanced multilevel methods are utilised. In addition, the chapter draws on semi-structured interviews with RO members in order to complement the quantitative insights with narrative evidence. This provides insights into the larger pattern and the underlying causal mechanisms. The chapter shows how

member state-, regional- and international-level variables interact and sheds light on the elements which are the most decisive for the extent to which today's international negotiation dynamics are regionalised.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present three in-depth case studies: the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty, the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary and the Rome Declaration on Nutrition. The cases are selected to allow for structure-focused comparisons between the negotiations in the ATT, the IWC and the FAO negotiation arenas. The studies apply process-tracing and combine content analysis of a wide array of different primary sources with triangulated, semi-structured interviews with more than 240 state, RO and IO representatives as well as civil society actors. The chapters illustrate how member state-, regional- and international-level variables impact negotiation success of regional actors in international negotiations and shed light on the elements which are the most decisive for the extent to which today's international negotiation outcomes are regionalised.

The concluding chapter summarises the major findings. It takes stock of today's regionalisation of international negotiation dynamics and international negotiation outcomes and discusses important implications. It ends with outlining avenues for future research.