democratic institutions and authoritarian rule in southeast europe

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In an important but often overlooked way, regime change after communism did not turn out as expected: Yugoslavia, as the most politically liberalised and economically westward-oriented state in the Eastern bloc, produced the bloodiest conflict (Tripalo 1993, King 2000). While the peoples of former Yugoslavia were fighting, a ‘horrified but nevertheless fascinated world wondered how it was possible that a seemingly prosperous and stable country could collapse into such a brutal internecine war’ (Stokes et al 1996). Due to this fact, among others, scholars have raised the question of whether democratisation in Southeast Europe should be approached as a distinctive model of regime change (Pridham 2000). Perhaps more to the point, scholars did not so much consciously question the existence of a separate democratisation trajectory, as they unconsciously avoided including country cases from Southeast Europe in their comparative assessments of post-communist democratisation. Even today countries of former Yugoslavia remain a blank spot in democratisation research (Džihić and Segert 2012). As a result, the majority of attempts at theorising post-communist democratisation are based on Central Eastern European cases (Bunce 1999, King 2000, Carothers 2002, Ramet and Wagner 2010). This book moves into this lacuna and analyses democratisation in Southeast Europe.

Figure 1.1 displays the puzzle that animates this endeavour. It shows the progress in democratisation that post-communist countries have made since 1991, using Freedom House scores for political and civil liberties. The scores have been combined into a composite following the same procedure as in Inglehart and Welzel (2005). As a result, on this scale zero represents the worst and twelve the best democratisation score. Figure 1.1 shows progress in democratisation over time for the regions of Southeast Europe, Central Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russia, and it covers the twenty-one year period from 1991 to 2012.

The first characteristic that catches the eye is that the two regions, Central Eastern and Southeast Europe, show progress in democracy scores over time, while the CIS and Russia exhibit stability and deterioration respectively. In the case of Russia deterioration of political and civil liberties is especially pronounced since 1997, while the CIS states show continuity in very low democracy scores. While trajectories of Russia and the CIS also merit attention of post-communist

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1. In a first step the two components of civil and political rights are summed up, and the sum is subtracted by two in order to obtain a 0–12 scale rather than 2–14. In the second step, the values have been reversed to make the scores more intuitive. These procedures make the interpretation of the scale easier, without affecting scores.
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**Figure 1.1: Democratic advances in post-communist regions for period 1991–2012**

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*Note:* Countries behind regional labels in Southeast Europe are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia; in Central Eastern Europe the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; and in CIS Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan.

*Source:* www.freedomhouse.org, calculations by author

democratisation scholars, they fall outside the scope of this study. Geddes argues that the ‘domains of theories of democratisation should be limited to cases that fit their basic assumptions about conditions in the old regime’, because otherwise the researcher is pursuing an impossible theory that would explain all outcomes (2009: 293). Following this advice, the domain of analysed country cases is limited to the two regions of Eastern Europe that share sufficient similarities regarding the previous regime. By focusing on Eastern Europe the study introduces two boundary conditions, the first involving constitutional frameworks, the second electoral systems. Russia and the CIS countries are referred to as superpresidencies (Fish 2001), due to the scope of powers vested in the president by their constitutions. Similarly, they are characterised by majoritarian electoral systems. By excluding majoritarian electoral systems and superpresidencies, the analysis focuses on European post-communist countries that had stronger institutional prerequisites for the development of multipartyism and of robust parliamentary opposition – factors which play a key role in the proposed explanatory framework. I therefore apply Geddes’ advice about the domain of the theory that I am proposing, both with respect to similarities in the previous regimes, and with respect to the similarity of constitutional setups, in order to increase the validity of the empirical findings. The objective is to extend the empirical grasp as well as revise existing theories of post-communist democratisation by systematically comparing democratisation trajectories of Southeast European and Central Eastern European countries. While for the moment conventional labels of Central Eastern and Southeast Europe are employed, the aim is to analyse the diversity that hides behind these labels and hence the study proceeds with an analysis of fourteen country cases.
Southeast (SEE) and Central Eastern European (CEE) countries have clearly made advances in the development of political and civil liberties of their societies since regime change, and this is particularly true for the improvement of formal democratic institutions such as free and fair elections. At the same time, the two regions exhibit important differences, and their comparison contains the key puzzle of this study. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the two regions did not have the same starting point, with CEE countries scoring an average of around nine at the very beginning of the process, while SEE countries started from a lower average score of six. Next, in the first decade of post-communist transformation, the CEE group made significant advances, already reaching the average score of eleven in 1999. In contrast, the SEE group of countries spent a large part of the first decade not making any democratic advances. This, however, is not surprising, since the average score for SEE countries was in large part driven by the very low scores of former Yugoslav states that were engaged in wars, especially between 1991 and 1995, but also throughout the decade.

Having this in mind, the explanation for the difference in democratic advances during the first decade after regime change seems obvious, perhaps even trivial. However, it is the difference in trajectories between the two regions since the end of the 1990s that presents a new and unexplored puzzle. In the second decade of democratisation, the CEE group of countries made one more jump forward, in 2004. This is the year that the group joined the European Union, and since then the average score for the region remains at the maximum; though with some worrying signs of backsliding in the most recent years since 2010. The other group of SEE countries, however, made a leap forward between 1998 and 2002 – but has since stagnated. This brief period was characterised by the first democratic alternation of power in Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia 1996–1998, as well as the ‘democratic turn’ elections in Serbia and Croatia in 2000 (Schimmelfennig 2005a). After democratic parties gained power across Southeast Europe at the beginning of the 2000s, the expectation was that the following period would be marked by significant movements forward in democracy scores. However, what we have witnessed instead is not democratisation, but stagnation.

How can this stagnation be explained? Pridham (2000) wrote at the end of the 1990s that the demands of state-building, national identity and ethnicity were much more pronounced in Southeast Europe, and that they have significantly distracted these countries from the priorities of democracy building and economic reform. But if the processes of state- and nation-building, as well as violent conflicts, explain why the region did not move forward during the first decade after regime change, how do we explain stagnation after these factors no longer exert an influence? If those are the reasons that the SEE group of countries did not catch up with respect to CEE until the late 1990s, why has the gap between the two regions not started closing in the last decade? Instead, if we look at the period since 2002, the gap between the two regions has actually increased. This is in spite of the fact – it is worth emphasising – that the average scores for the Southeast group include Bulgaria and Romania, two countries that joined the European Union in 2007.
Therefore, the central question is why Southeast Europe has not been catching up with Central Eastern Europe in the second decade since regime change. Focusing on the period after state-building and violent conflicts ceased, the answer as to why countries in Southeast Europe seem to dwell in a low-level equilibrium requires moving away from saying that this was a conflict-ridden region and looking for alternative explanations. The fact that violent conflicts which occurred in former Yugoslav states offer only a partial explanation is accentuated by the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, which did not undergo either state-building or war, but which nevertheless seem to share the fate of post-Yugoslav states when it comes to democratisation trajectories. Observing democratic development in post-communist Europe over the last ten years with these questions in mind reveals a phenomenon well worth exploring.

Democracy is here not understood as a predetermined end state but as an open-ended outcome (Whitehead 2002). In line with this conceptualisation, the term transition is abandoned, having over time become equated with a linear understanding of progress towards a preselected destination of liberal democracy and market economy (cf. Fukuyama 1992). The divergent development of Third Wave democracies, most of which remain in the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and authoritarianism, testify to reality not following the ‘predictable democratisation script’ (Carothers 2002: 14). Instead, the key concepts employed to explain democratisation processes in post-communist Europe are regime change and transformation processes that occurred in the economic, social and political domains. The concept of regime change is important because it shifts focus to the critical juncture (Collier and Collier 1991), which opened with the fall of communist regimes at the end of the 1980s. It draws attention to a moment in history which had vast potential for rewriting the institutional rules and endorsing a new set of norms. This study starts from the premise that by unravelling features of this critical juncture it becomes possible to explain long-term processes of democratisation.

The concept of transformation on the other hand evokes the open-endedness of the process of democratisation as well as not prejudicing the outcome. This is important in a study that is designed to explore a diversity of outcomes. In addition to that, transformation assumes a more complex and multifaceted process of change than is implied by the concept of transition. State socialism in Eastern Europe had the misfortune of collapsing at a time when Western countries advocated a very uniform recipe of development that was premised on establishing free and fair elections coupled with the Washington Consensus economic reforms. Notwithstanding that, twenty years later there is a multiplicity of outcomes across the former Eastern bloc, and hence an open-ended concept of transformation seems better suited to the studied phenomenon. The adopted concept of transformation draws from neo-modernisation analysis or the multiple modernities perspective (Spohn 2009). While the basic premises of modernisation theory are preserved, its homogenising assumption, according to which developing countries follow the prescribed Western paths to democracy and capitalism, is rejected (Eisenstadt 2000).
In this chapter the fourteen selected cases are compared by employing the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, analysing ways in which long term structural factors such as socioeconomic development and previous regime legacies influenced democratisation trajectories of European post-communist countries.

**How socioeconomic development influences democratisation**

Though Chapter 2 quoted many theoretical and empirical studies that claim a relationship between economic development and democracy, before proceeding with further analyses it seems crucial to establish whether data for the fourteen analysed countries supports the relationship. Data used to perform this analysis are Freedom House scores for democracy and World Bank data for GDP per capita (in current US$), an indicator most often used for economic development. A simple linear regression is designed, with democracy as the dependent variable, and economic development as the independent variable:

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democracy = a + b \times \text{economic development} + e
\]

Data covers the twenty-one-year period from 1989 to 2009, and there are 273 observations in total. A one year lag is introduced in the dataset, assuming that a given level of economic development shows up in democracy scores the following year. The results of the regression procedure show a Pearson’s R of 0.566, indicating a fairly strong relationship between economic development and democratisation, and this correlation is significant at 0.01 level. The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.321, indicating that about 30 per cent of the variance in democracy scores is accounted for by the level of economic development. Overall this finding represents a firm confirmation that the level of economic development influences democratisation advances. Lipset’s argument seems to hold in the case of post-communist Europe too, and we can use this finding as a baseline for the analysis that follows.

The history of economic development of Eastern Europe during the twentieth century reveals Eastern Europe as a relatively backward region, even though attempts were made in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to catch up with Western Europe (Berend 1997). Through the introduction of Western institutions and joining the international trade system at the onset of the nineteenth century this region made progress, but it was not able to close the development gap relative to Western Europe. As can be seen from Table 3.1, in 1820 and 1870 Eastern European countries reached 58.1 and 48.8 per cent of Western European per capita GDP level respectively (ibid., data from Maddison 1994). After that, at the start
of the twentieth century the region declined to 42 per cent of Western European GDP per capita, and stagnated during the first half of the twentieth century. By the outbreak of the Second World War, Eastern Europe was at 44.1 per cent of the Western European GDP per capita.

During the 1950s the region achieved fastest development, growing at an average rate of 3.9 per cent between 1950 and 1973 and improving its relative position to other peripheral regions such as Latin America. Still, even during the period of its unprecedented development, the region could not advance beyond 50 per cent of development in Western European economies. After that, in the last third of the twentieth century, the catching-up endeavour failed. A period of stagnation and crisis ended in the collapse of communist regimes 1989–1991. Between 1973 and 1992, Eastern Europe had a negative growth of -0.8 per cent, while Western Europe managed to grow at a rate of 1.8 per cent during the same period (Berend 1997). As a result, the development gap between the two regions plunged from a ratio of 1:2 to a ratio of 1:4. By the end of the twentieth century, when across the region former communist regimes collapsed, European post-communist countries’ relative position to Western Europe was far worse than it was in the mid-nineteenth century. At the moment of regime change the fourteen analysed countries were significantly poorer and less developed than their Western European neighbours. However, in addressing the relationship between economic development and democracy, it is not the relative position of Eastern Europe to that of the West that is crucial, but rather whether the level of development they achieved was sufficient to sustain democratic regimes.

The changing level of economic development in the period after 1989 represents another important aspect of the picture. Figure 3.1 displays change in real GDP per capita for the fourteen countries studied, over the period 1989–2009, using World Bank data.  

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1. Real GDP per capita for the 20 years under study is calculated by using World Bank data on GDP.
The flat line in Figure 3.1 displays a cut-off point at $6,000, representing Przeworski’s cut-off point for democratic survival, or in other words the level of income above which economic development is argued to contribute positively to democratic survival and development. The only country that keeps fairly high above this cut-off point is Slovenia, falling below only in 1992, right after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The data series for Slovenia starts in 1990, when Slovenia’s GDP per capita was at $8,699 while the rest of the group was between $642 (Albania) and $5,184 (Croatia). Regarding change over time, while GDP per capita scores for the fourteen countries were fairly similar at the beginning of 1990s, in the second decade after regime change these scores diverge considerably. Before the financial crisis in 2008, the spread of GDP per capita scores was between $25,807 (Slovenia) and $3,953 (Albania). In other words, after two decades of democratic development Slovenia was at a 71 per cent of EU’s GDP per capita, while Albania was at 11 per cent of EU’s GDP per capita. At the moment of regime change thirteen countries were below the $6,000 threshold, while in 2010 Serbia ($5,056), Macedonia ($4,201) and Albania ($3,595) remain the only ones below the threshold, with Bulgaria hovering just above the threshold at $6,129 GDP per capita. In all remaining countries the levels of economic development in the second decade after regime change have become high enough by Przeworski’s per capita in current $US and the GDP deflator also provided by the World Bank online dataset.

The calculation is based on the following formula: real GDP = nom GDP / ((GDP deflator/100)+1).

2. Average GDP per capita for the European Union in 2010 was $32,365 (World Bank Data).
criteria to positively influence democratisation. However, as Figure 3.1 shows, the second decade after regime change also displays a fair amount of divergence, with mainly CEE group of countries making significant strides forward, including Croatia and Slovenia, while in the SEE group Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania made more modest advances in economic development since 2000.

Does economic development as displayed in Figure 3.1 help us understand how democratisation progressed over the twenty year period? In the initial period 1989–1995, no country except Slovenia had crossed the democracy threshold of $6,000. Even Slovenia could be added to the indeterminate group since between 1991 and 1993 its real GDP per capita was below $6,000. At the same time, if we look at data for 1990, the difference between $642 GDP per capita in Albania and $5,184 GDP per capita in Croatia is certainly not trivial. To establish whether these levels of economic development were varied enough to account for differences in subsequent democratisation, these findings are first compared to other development indicators, then correlated with democratisation outcomes.

Back when Lipset (1959) posited the famous relationship between economic development and democracy, apart from looking at levels of wealth in the given countries, he also examined levels of urbanisation, education and industrialisation. Since the aim is to establish as detailed as possible a development context for the early 1990s, many data sources have been mined for information. Table 3.2 shows a number of key indicators of modernisation for the fourteen countries. Countries are sorted by first indicator, GDP per capita, descending from highest to lowest.

Assembling this dataset was a challenge, as can be seen from the long list of sources that were used. While data for the CEE group of countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania is fairly accessible, data on former Yugoslav republics has proven difficult to obtain, especially in the case of Serbia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s). As a result, Table 3.2 is an amalgam of various data sources, as is indicated in the reference list. The first six columns of the table show indicators of wealth, per cent of rural population, life expectancy, telephone lines per hundred inhabitants and gross enrolment ratios for basic and tertiary education in 1990. The next column to the right, which shows HDI rankings, serves to separate data from the moment of regime change in 1990 from historical data on literacy and urbanisation prior to communism in these countries. Finally, the last column shows civil society sustainability scores, but for a later period since this USAID index is only available since the end of the 1990s.

Tito had been the primary *gelling ingredient* of Yugoslavism, and his death in 1980 produced both a power vacuum and a crisis of succession (Vladisavljević 2008). After his death the republican communist organisations started increasingly diverging with respect to how the country should be organised and run. Serbia wanted more authority for the central government, while almost everyone else agreed that confederation was the way forward, with maximum autonomy for the constituent republics. In this way, ‘the stage was set for an open interethnic conflict in Yugoslavia’ (Kasapović and Zakošek 1997: 23). Between 1981 and 1989 Serbia was suppressing claims for rights and more autonomy of Albanians in Kosovo, transforming the Serbian Communist Party into a nationalist organisation and virtually abolishing the autonomy of two provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo (Banac 1992).

However, as Slovenia and Croatia started moving towards secession it became clear that Milošević had in mind the creation of a Greater Serbia. His intention was to incorporate Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia into the same political community (Banac 1992, Mazower 2002, Ramet 1996, Ramet and Wagner 2010). The Milošević-led Yugoslav Army aided the Serbian uprising in Croatia in the late 1990 and Serbian militias occupied large chunks of territory in Croatia during 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992. Serbia was planning to annex the Republic Srpska from Bosnia and the majority Serb populated region of Krajina in Croatia into Greater Serbia or ‘some other type of union of Serbian states’ (1993). Furthermore, Serbia-cum-Yugoslavia was involved in violent conflicts in its province of Kosovo, which began in early 1998 and ended with NATO bombing in March 1999.²

Tragically, Serbian citizens were fighting in wars for almost a decade. The wars were attempts to gain territories within former republics of Yugoslavia as well as attempts to keep and regain control over territories that Serbia considered

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1. As reported in the AIM news report on November 10, 1993.

2. In 2001 Human Rights Watch issued the report *Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo*, documenting war crimes committed by Serbian and Yugoslav government forces against Kosovar Albanians between March 24 and June 12, 1999, the period of NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia. It reveals a systematic campaign to terrorise, kill, and expel the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo that was organised by the highest levels of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments in power at that time. This report is available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/10/26/under-orders-war-crimes-kosovo. Last accessed August 19, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml
constitutive to its historical state borders. However, by 1999 the borders of Serbia were almost back to where they were at the end of the nineteenth century (Mazower 2002). In addition to an almost decade-long experience of violence, sanctions and international isolation, Serbia went through a complex process of state identity shifting. After Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia seceded in 1991, the only remaining former republics of the Yugoslav federation were Serbia and Montenegro. The two republics established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992, aspiring to be the legal successor state to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This was disputed by the international community, and eventually Serbia and Montenegro accepted the opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee about shared succession and applied for UN membership as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This union was a loose confederation, which ended in 2006 when Montenegrins voted in favour of independence. In the same year Serbia declared independence as a sovereign state, signalling hope that the country was finally able to clearly delineate its territory and establish its state sovereignty.

However, the dissolution of confederation with Montenegro did not end Serbia’s stateness problem because the issue of Kosovo remains unresolved since Kosovo proclaimed independence in 2008. Serbia did not accept this unilateral claim for independence and filed a complaint before the UN disputing Kosovo’s right to secede, and the case was put before the UN’s International Court of Justice. During this time Belgrade placed an embargo on Kosovo goods following the 2008 declaration of independence, breaching the terms of the Central European Free Trade Agreement, CEFTA. In 2010 the ICJ ruled that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate international law. Serbia’s reaction to the ICJ ruling was that it would ‘never recognise the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo’. The dispute over Kosovo’s independence remains a chief obstacle to Serbia’s statehood issue, stalling not only its European integration process but its democratisation more broadly. Neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, like several other EU member states with large minorities, have not recognised Kosovo for fear that this case might serve as a precedent. Kosovo and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain chief sources


5. For instance Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain and Romania.

6. Early in 2011 Republika Srpska was threatening to hold a referendum on independence. The situation was diffused through EU intervention, but it illustrates the precariousness of the situation. More information is available in the International Crisis Group report available online at
of instability in Southeast Europe and the future of both these entities depends to a large extent on Serbia. In the summer of 2011 new clashes erupted at the border crossings in Serb-controlled North Kosovo. The fact that some Serbian officials were suggesting the partition of Kosovo as a solution to the problem sent a warning signal of continuing sources of instability.

This introductory analysis serves to show that Serbia’s state borders and territorial integrity have not been fully established to this day – keeping its stateness problem centre stage in the domestic political arena. In 2011 Serbia was still not a political community with a clearly defined population and internal sovereignty on a clearly demarked territory (also Pavićević 2010). The following sections trace how the stateness problem influenced the evolution of the mode of rule under Slobodan Milošević throughout the 1990s, and how it continues to hamper democratisation in Serbia.

Milošević as the people’s tyrant

Until April 1987 Slobodan Milošević was a ‘little-known Serbian Communist apparatchik’ (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 241). On April 24 he delivered the infamous speech in Kosovo, inflaming the already widespread sentiments of victimisation among Serbs by saying ‘No one dare beat you!’ This speech was broadcast on national television, propelling Milošević to the forefront of the Serbian nationalist revival (ibid.). In the period 1987 to 1989 together with allies in the state apparatus, the Yugoslav Army and Yugoslav League of Communists he organised mass rallies and media events. He skilfully exploited the position of Serbs in Kosovo and he used nationalist ideology as his selling point. The wholesale mobilisation of Serbian nationalism and the accompanying anti-bureaucratic revolution helped Milošević win the presidency of Serbia in December 1987 (ibid.).

Milošević was brought to power on the wave of a deeply undemocratic mobilisation movement. While democratic revolutions were taking place in countries of Central Eastern Europe, during the late 1980s Serbia’s intellectual elite was developing a political platform deeply imbedded in traditionalism, nationalism and an authoritarian rejection of democracy. Perović (1996) analysed


8. Author’s interviews with Hedvig Morvaj Horvat (Interview No. 8, November 2010) and Slaviša Orlović (Interview No. 16, February 2011).

columns published in Serbia’s most widely read daily newspaper *Politika* since the late 1980s, tracing the development of an elaborate scholarly argument against multi-party democracy, for the unification of Serbs and for the re-establishment of Serbian statehood rooted in traditional ideas of national sovereignty. The antibureaucratic revolution further homogenised Serbian citizens, evoking collectivism and essentialist concepts of the nation as ethnic community. The ruling party exploited the citizens’ fear of losing social rights and the fear of capitalism, which were encouraged during the state socialist regime, and transformed it into the fear of losing national identity and Serbia’s statehood (Obradović 1996). In a nutshell, Serbia was rejecting the wave of democratic and market reforms that had swept across post-communist Europe.

Events in 1989 and 1990 set Serbia’s trajectory clearly apart from the rest of post-communist Europe, ushering communist revival supplanted with ethnic nationalism (Vejvoda 2000). In July 1990 the ruling Serbian League of Communists merged with the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia to form the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), led by Milošević (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). SPS inherited the connections, patronage, financial and infrastructural assets of its predecessors and grew into a political organisation that dominated Serbia’s politics throughout the 1990s. While Bulgaria and Romania were also characterised by a continuation in power of former Communist parties under a new guise, the case of Serbia is unique in that the SPS never rejected socialist ideology or bothered to put on a reformed modern Social Democratic face. This was in full contrast to the Croatian Communist Party, which reformed into the Social Democratic Party and tried to shed any continuity with their previous incarnation (Goati 2004).

In its 1990 programme, the SPS declared itself to be a party maintaining continuity with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, aiming to reinvigorate socialism by purging it of bureaucratic deformations (Obradović 1996). Another key component that set the SPS platform apart from the Socialist parties in Bulgaria and Romania was hostility towards the West, which was equated with imperialism (Obradović 1996, Perović 1996). At the same time, for all the inflammatory rhetoric Milošević is best understood as a pragmatic that deployed nationalism, warfare and media control in order to neutralise rivals and remain in power (Gordy 1999, Gagnon 2004; quoted in Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). His objective was to use the trappings of power to the fullest, and he relied on the family as the strongest social institution in the Balkans to achieve that (Gallagher 2003).

Multipartyism was legalised in the summer of 1990, and the first multiparty elections were held in December 1990. Though the election was announced as late as possible in order to disable opponents from preparing, it was contested by several parties that subsequently became a permanent part of the political landscape in Serbia. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) was a nationalist party under the leadership of Vuk Drašković. The Democratic Party (DP) attracted Serbian intelligentsia of various stripes such as Vojislav Koštunica on the one